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The consumer bankruptcy system plays an enormous albeit largely under 
appreciated role in the United States economy.  There were nearly 1.6 million consumer 
bankruptcy filings in the United States in 2004 – more than twice the number just ten 
years earlier, and more than one filing for every 70 households in the country.  Nearly a 
third of these filings were under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.  (Chapter 13 
provides for individual debt readjustment pursuant to a repayment plan, whereas Chapter 
7 provides for liquidation of assets to pay creditor claims.) Yet, little is known about what 
debtors and creditors accomplish in Chapter 13 cases or how well the Chapter 13 system 
serves its intended purposes.  
This article reports on the findings of the Chapter 13 Project, a national empirical 
study of 795 Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings in seven federal judicial districts.  Funded by 
the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges and the American Bankruptcy Institute, it 
is the first and only national study of its kind.  It provides a detailed portrait of the 
Chapter 13 system and the extent to which Chapter 13 has fulfilled its principal purposes 
-- debtor fresh start, on the one hand, and creditor repayment, on the other.  
The article first reports on who is using Chapter 13 – the gender, income, 
indebtedness and other bankruptcy filings of the debtors in the sample.  It then reports on 
the extent to which the debtors in the seven districts completed their plans and obtained a 
discharge.  Next, we consider various debtor characteristics – gender, income, amount 
and type of debt, debt-income ratio, other filings – and certain plan features – length, 
proposed distribution to unsecured creditors, income reserved for payment of living 
expenses – for their relation to case outcome.  Regarding creditor repayment, the study 
reports in detail on the amounts and types of debt that are collected by creditors in 
Chapter 13 cases.
The Project has produced a wealth of new information and insights into the 
Chapter 13 system.  Some of the highlights include: Most of the debtors in the sample 
were far less affluent than the population as a whole.  At least 50% of the debtors had
filed one or more other petitions.  Discharge rates varied significantly by district, but 
overall only one-third of the debtors completed a plan.  We found statistically significant 
correlations between case outcome and debtor income, amount and type of debt, and 
other filings.  Equally revealing, the study found no significant relationship between case 
outcome and plan feasibility, proposed plan length or proposed distribution to unsecured 
creditors.  Regarding creditor repayment, the study reports that the primary creditor 
beneficiaries by far of the Chapter 13 system are secured creditors; and that less than a 
third of trustee disbursements were to general unsecured creditors.  The median amount 
paid to unsecured creditors in all cases was $0. 
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4DEBTOR DISCHARGE AND CREDITOR REPAYMENT IN CHAPTER 13
I. INTRODUCTION
There were nearly 1.6 million consumer bankruptcy filings in the United States in 
2004.  That is more than twice the number just ten years earlier,3 and more than one filing 
for every 70 households in the country.4 Almost 29% of these filings – over 467,000 –
were under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.5 With the dramatic increases in 
consumer filings, even in prosperous economic times, there has been much debate about 
the causes of the “bankruptcy epidemic.”6  The debate culminated last year in the 
enactment of extensive reform of U.S. consumer bankruptcy laws.  The core of the legal 
reforms is a “means test” that is designed to limit consumer debtor access to Chapter 7, 
requiring some debtors to file for relief under Chapter 13 or not at all.  Yet, little is 
known about what debtors and creditors accomplish in Chapter 13 cases or how well the 
Chapter 13 system serves its intended purposes.  The government collects minimal
information about consumer bankruptcy filings, and academic research has been limited.  
The first national study of its kind, the Chapter 13 Project provides a detailed
portrait of the Chapter 13 system and the extent to which Chapter 13 has fulfilled its 
principal purposes -- debtor fresh start, on the one hand, and creditor repayment, on the 
other.  In addition, the study explores an array of debtor characteristics, Chapter 13 plan 
features, and district and trustee practices for their relationship to debtor discharge and 
debt repayment in Chapter 13.  Like several other studies before it, the Project also 
describes the debtors who have used Chapter 13.
II. SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PROJECT FINDINGS
A. Debtor Discharge
The overall discharge rate for the debtors in the seven districts covered by the 
Project was 33%; 67% of cases were dismissed or converted, 23% before confirmation 
and 44% after confirmation. As a percentage of cases with a confirmed plan (excluding 
cases dismissed before confirmation), the discharge rate was nearly 43%.
3
  In 1994, there were 780,455 non-business filings.  See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1983-
2003 Bankruptcy Filings, 12-month period ending June, by Chapter and District, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
bnkrpctystats/1960-0312-MonthJune.pdf.  Filings increased again, significantly, in 2005.  Much or all of
this increase is attributable to debtors filing in advance of the effective date of most of the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 in October 2005.  
4
 As of March 2003, there were 111 million households in the United States.  See http://www.census.gov/ 
prod/2004pubs/p20-553.pdf (last checked Dec. 20, 2004).
5
  See supra note 3.
6
  See generally Personal Bankruptcy: A Literature Review, CBO Paper, Congressional Budget Office 
(Sept. 2000) (reviewing the macro-economic literature relating to filing rates, factors leading to personal 
bankruptcy, the ability of Chapter 7 filers to repay their debts, and how personal bankruptcy affects the 
supply of credit; with bibliography of studies). 
5Discharge rates varied considerably across the seven districts in the sample, from 
a low of 27% (or 20% including cases dismissed before confirmation) in the Western 
District of Tennessee to a high of 54% (or 47% including cases dismissed before 
confirmation) in the Middle District of North Carolina. We expected, but did not find, 
that higher plan completion rates correlate with higher pre-confirmation dismissal rates.  
This and several other findings support the conclusion that some courts do not carefully
screen cases for feasibility at confirmation.  On the other hand, the data also reveal that 
apparent lack of feasibility is not significantly related to case outcome.
One of the more striking findings of the study is that at least 50% of the debtors 
filed one or more other bankruptcy cases, either before or after the sample case.  Thirty 
percent (30%) filed at least one other case, 10% two other cases, and 10% three or more 
other cases.  There was a statistically significant relation between judicial district and 
incidence of other filings; about 20% of the debtors in the Middle District of North 
Carolina filed a later petition, while no less than 56% of the debtors in the Western 
District of Tennessee have filed more than one case, compared to the overall subsequent 
refiling rate of 33%.  The great majority of the other filings were also under Chapter 13, 
and most were made within a year of the filing in the sample case. Debtors who filed 
bankruptcy for the first time in the sample case were significantly more likely to 
complete their plans than debtors who had filed one or more previous cases.  Thirty-eight 
percent (38%) of first-time filers completed their plans compared to 22.5% who had filed 
one previous case.  The discharge rate plummeted to 14% for debtors who had filed two 
or more cases before the sample case.
Nearly one in seven (15%) debtors who received a discharge went on to file 
another case.
Debtors in nearly 45% of the cases in which a proposed distribution was reported 
proposed to pay no more than 25% of unsecured claims.  In 31% of cases the debtors 
proposed to pay 100%.  Relatively few debtors – less than 10% -- proposed to pay 
between 26% and 99%. There was no significant difference in the proposed percentage 
to be paid on unsecured debt by debtors in completed cases and debtors in cases that were 
dismissed or converted. 
Notably, a very large percentage of the debtors proposed plans longer than the 
minimum 36 months required by the Code; the median and modal lengths of the sample 
debtors’ plans were 60 months, or 24 months longer than the standard set out in the 
Bankruptcy Code.  Indeed, the length of plans at the 25th percentile was 47 months, or 
nearly a year longer than the standard envisioned by the Bankruptcy Code. However, 
debtors who proposed shorter plans were more likely to complete their plans.  
Joint petitioners were significantly more likely to complete a plan than individual 
filers.  The higher completion rate for joint filers could not be tied to the presence of a 
second income, however.  Individual petitioners reporting spousal income did not 
complete their plans at a statistically significantly greater rate than individual filers who 
did not report a second income.  
6Debtors who completed their plans on average owed more total pre-bankruptcy 
debt, and had higher debt-income ratios, than debtors whose cases were dismissed or 
converted.   Perhaps debtors who were more reluctant to file were more committed to 
doing what was necessary to complete a plan. 
B. Creditor Repayment
The primary creditor beneficiaries by far of the Chapter 13 system are secured 
creditors.  Nationally, the percentage of trustee disbursements to secured creditors ranged 
between 60% and 69% of total disbursements between 1994 and 2003.  Yet, these 
percentages substantially understate the proportion of all payments by Chapter 13 debtors 
to secured creditors, because they do not include payments made directly by debtors to 
secured creditors, in particular mortgage creditors. 
Less than a third of trustee disbursements were to general unsecured creditors.
Chapter 13 costs, which include debtor attorney’s fees, clerk’s noticing fees 
charged to the case, and any § 507(b) awards, were a sizable portion of total trustee 
distributions to creditors, and equaled a very large percentage of disbursements to general 
unsecured creditors.  The ratio of Chapter 13 costs to total trustee disbursements was 
quite stable over the years 1994 to 2003, ranging from 15% to 18%.  The ratio of Chapter 
13 costs to total trustee disbursements to general unsecured creditors ranged between 
59% and 75%; in other words, Chapter 13 costs equaled as much as 75% of 
disbursements to unsecured creditors.
Not surprisingly, creditor collections were greater in cases with a confirmed plan, 
and greater still in cases that proceeded to discharge of the debtor.  Even so, debtors paid 
no more unsecured debt in cases dismissed before confirmation than in cases dismissed 
after confirmation.  
C. Profile of the Debtors
The debtors in the Chapter 13 Project are very similar in terms of gender, debt-
income ratio, and homeownership rates to debtors in previous studies.  Most of the 
debtors in the Chapter 13 Project were far less affluent than the population as a whole.  In 
1994 dollars, only 25% earned more than $26,000 per year.  Half earned less than 
$18,000 in annual gross income, and 25% earned less than $13,000.  The mean debtor 
household annual income was less than half the mean for all households; and the median 
was less than 60% of the median for all households in the country.  
D. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
The Chapter 13 Project establishes a detailed picture of Chapter 13 outcomes that 
will serve as a baseline for measuring the much-criticized changes in the law wrought by 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.  The BAPCPA 
7reforms are complex, and their effects on Chapter 13 outcomes for debtors and creditors 
are subject to considerable speculation.  For example, the new provision limiting strip-
down of certain purchase money security interests in Chapter 137 might be expected to 
further increase the share of Chapter 13 disbursements paid to secured creditors and to 
correspondingly reduce payments to unsecured creditors.  At the same time, this anti-lien 
stripping provision may lead some debtors who would otherwise file in Chapter 13 to file 
under Chapter 7 because they can not afford to pay 100% of the claim,8 also reducing 
collections by unsecured creditors.  For debtors who are or would be means-tested out of 
Chapter 7, the means test will determine the amount of their “disposable income” that 
must be devoted to a Chapter 13 plan.9  Whether this test requires more or less in debtor 
plan payments than the current disposable income test remains to be seen.  The new 
limitations on repeat filings may boost overall discharge rates and thus increase average 
creditor collections per case.  The credit counseling and debtor education requirements 
also may have far-ranging consequences.   
III. DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
The Chapter 13 Project is an empirical study of 795 Chapter 13 cases filed in 
1994 in seven federal judicial districts comprising 14 Chapter 13 trusteeships.  The seven 
federal judicial districts are: Northern District of Georgia, Southern District of Georgia, 
Middle District of North Carolina, Middle District of Tennessee, Western District of 
Tennessee, District of Maryland, and Western District of Pennsylvania.  Collectively, 
these seven districts accounted for a very large portion – nearly 20% -- of Chapter 13 
filings nationally in 1994.  There were 240,639 Chapter 13 filings in 1994, including 
47,393 in the seven sample districts.10
In each district, we pulled a quota sample of one percent (1%) of the Chapter 13 
cases filed in 1994, but no fewer than 100 cases. The sample includes 165 cases from the 
Northern District of Georgia, 130 cases from the Western District of Tennessee, and 100 
cases from each of the other five districts. 
The Chapter 13 Project’s sample of debtors, trusteeships and districts is highly 
representative of the nation as a whole, notwithstanding that there are significant 
variations in practice among districts, judges and trustees across the country.11 The 
7
  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
8
  Chapter 13 Trustee Study (finding that anti-lien-stripping provision would make 21% of Chapter 13 plans 
unconfirmable, and distributions to unsecured creditors would be substantially reduced in 45% of cases).
9
  11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3).
10
  See supra note 3.
11
  The study of the bankruptcy system in the United States poses some difficult challenges in that, while 
one Code and one set of Rules of Procedure govern all cases in all bankruptcy courts, there are wide 
variations in the local practices and attitudes of bankruptcy trustees, lawyers and judges.  Sometimes 
referred to as “local legal culture,” these variations often are large and contribute substantially to case 
outcomes for debtors and creditors alike. See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One 
Code, Many Cultures, 67 Am. Bankr. L. J. 501 (1993); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. 
Westbrook., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal 
Bankruptcy Courts, 17 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 801 (1994); William C. Whitford, Has the Time Come to 
Repeal Chapter 13, 65 Ind. L. J. 85 (1989); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, 
8discharge rate for the 795 debtors, as well as the average discharge rate across the seven 
districts, was almost identical to the oft-cited national average of 33%.12  Further, the 
amounts and types of debt repaid by the debtors were similar to the national averages
reported by the Executive Office for United States Trustees for all Chapter 13 cases 
closed during the same time period.13 The percentages of male and female petitioners, 
and the debt-income ratios of the debtors were comparable to those observed in other 
studies.14
While representative of the nation in the key areas of debtor discharge and 
creditor repayment, the sample is, of course, not a national sample.  The sample districts 
are located mostly in Southern states with higher Chapter 13 filing rates.  At the same 
time, the choice of seven districts that accounted for nearly 20% of all Chapter 13 filings 
likely contributed to, rather than detracted from, the representativeness of the sample.  
The representativeness of the sample also was not undermined by the fact that it includes 
one percent of 1994 filings in NDGA and WDTN, and more than one percent of filings in 
the other five districts (ranging from 1.9% of Chapter 13 filings in SDGA in 1994 to 
11.9% in WDPA).15 Further, by including a minimum of 100 cases from each district, 
we were able to run several inter-district analyses and intra-district comparisons.
We use the term “significant” throughout the paper to mean statistical 
significance.  Statistical analyses were performed using the SPSS software package.  We 
used a criterion level of 5%; thus, statistical significance is inferred only where there 
would be a 5% or less probability that a finding arose by chance.  Most of the time, we 
used chi-square tests for comparisons of nominal and ordinal variables (e.g., district, case 
disposition, other filings, etc.); and t-tests for comparisons of interval variables (e.g., 
income, debt, etc.).  The statistical analyses do not interpolate or extrapolate the values of 
missing data.  If data were not available, the case was excluded from the relevant 
analysis.  Much of the data analyzed for the study did not meet the criteria to be 
considered normally distributed in the sample; when normality assumptions were 
substantially violated and could not easily be resolved by excluding outlying scores (+3 
SD’s above the mean), non-parametric statistical analyses were used in order to maintain 
a Type I error rate of less than .05.
Laws, Models, and Real People: Choice of Chapter in Personal Bankruptcy, 13 Law and Soc. Inq. 661, 
693-700 (1988).
12
  See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text and Tables 18 and 19.
13
  See infra notes 174-179 and accompanying text and Tables 43 and 44.  (While the sample debtors repaid 
somewhat more secured debt than the estimated national average, the difference was well within the 
standard deviation for the sample.)  In addition, the ratio of trustee disbursements to secured, priority and 
unsecured creditors, the increases in disbursements over the period 1994-2003, and the ratios of Chapter 13 
costs to total creditor and to unsecured creditor disbursements in the sample districts are very closely 
comparable to the national figures.  See id.
14
  See infra notes 23-23 and accompanying text and Table 1.
15
  Arguably, the statistical analyses of data on all debtors should be performed on the same percentage of 
cases from each district, in order to assure that district- or trustee-based variations in the data do not 
disproportionately impact the national picture created by the data set.  
9At several points in the paper, we compare financial data (e.g., debtor income, 
average disbursements per case) for one year with data for another year.  In doing so, we 
adjusted the dollar amounts using the commonly used Consumer Price Index. 
By way of caveat, there are several limitations inherent in the data with respect to 
(a) the amounts of long-term secured debt – usually, mortgage debt – owed by the 
debtors, and (b) the amounts of such debt repaid by the debtors.  Long- term mortgage
debts normally entail two components in Chapter 13 cases: first, a claim for prepetition 
arrearages, invariably reported as a separate claim, which was to be paid under the plan; 
and second, a claim for the balance of the mortgage loan, as to which the debtor was to
make the regular monthly payments due after filing.  Then, as now, districts and trustees 
followed either of two different practices regarding post filing mortgage payments.  In 
some districts, debtors ordinarily make post filing mortgage payments through the plan, 
while in other districts they typically make these payments directly to the mortgagee.16
In the former districts, the payments to secured creditors reported by the trustees naturally 
were much, much larger than those reported in the other districts, although the debtors in 
both districts made postpetition mortgage payments.  As to this problem, it simply was 
not possible to ascertain how much debtors might have paid to mortgagees outside a plan, 
nor was it possible to separate mortgage payments made under a plan from other secured 
debt payments made under the plan.  Thus, the Project data understate debtor payments to
secured creditors, because they include ongoing mortgage payments for some debtors 
(those in districts in which these payments were made through the plan), but not for 
others (those in districts in which these payments normally were not made under the 
plan).  
Also problematic in some trusteeships or cases, long-term mortgage (non-
arrearage) claims may have been included in the trustee’s record of secured claims 
against the debtor, while in other trusteeships or cases these claims were not listed.  If
included, the debtor’s secured and total indebtedness obviously would appear much 
larger than if these claims are not included.  As to this problem, we achieved consistency 
by excluding long-term mortgage debts from our calculations; the data we report on 
allowed claims and debtor indebtedness,17 debt-income ratios,18 relationship between
debt-income ratio and case outcome,19 and relationship between creditor claims and case 
outcome20 exclude long-term mortgage debts as best we were able.21  As a result, 
16
  See Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Chapter 13: Who Pays the Mortgage?, 
ABI J. (June 2001), p. 20 (reporting that “in 1999, one-third (58/175) of the standing trustees were making 
ongoing mortgage payments for at least some of their cases”).  See also Gordon Bermant, Making Post-
Petition Mortgage Payments Through the Plan: A Survey of Standing Chapter 13 Trustees, A First Draft 
Report of Survey Results to the Endowment Committee of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges 
(July 2004) (manuscript on file with the author) (reporting on survey of standing Chapter 13 trustees 
regarding practices respecting payment of mortgages under the plan).   In his survey of Chapter 13 trustees 
who make post-petition mortgage payments through the plan, Dr. Bermant found that about half do so only 
when the debtors owe mortgage arrearages.  Id. at 16.
17
  Infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text and Table 8.
18
  Infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text and Table 9.
19
 Infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text and Table 27.
20
  Infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text and Table 26.
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however, the data understate the debtors’ secured debt, total indebtedness and debt-
income ratios to the extent of any long-term mortgage debt.
In all districts and trusteeships, mortgage arrearage claims were reflected in the 
trustee records, and further, were almost invariably paid under, not outside, the plan.  The 
data that we report regarding amounts of secured and total indebtedness and debt-income 
ratios includes mortgage arrearages; and the data that we report on debt repayment 
includes plan payments on mortgage arrearages.  
Additional details regarding the design and methodology of the study are included
in Appendix A, Design and Methodology of the Study; and Appendix B, the Chapter 13 
Project Coding Sheet.
IV. PROFILE OF CHAPTER 13 DEBTORS
As a preface to the following Parts V and VI regarding debtor discharge and 
creditor repayment in Chapter 13, this Part IV sketches a limited profile of the debtors in 
the study sample based on information available from the Chapter 13 trustee reports, 
bankruptcy court case files and PACER.  In particular, this Part reports on the gender and 
household size, income, indebtedness, debt to income ratio, homeowner status, and 
previous and subsequent bankruptcy filings of the 795 debtors in the study sample.  
A. Gender and Household Size of Petitioners
1. Gender
The petitioners were almost exactly evenly divided between men and women.22
As reported in Table 1, women comprised 36.3% of the petitioners, and men comprised 
36.9%.  The balance was joint petitioners.  Other recent studies likewise have found that 
about 35-40% of bankruptcy petitioners were women filing singly.23
21
  A few long-term mortgage debts may not have been excluded; the Chapter 13 trustee case data may not 
always have correctly typed a mortgage claim as a mortgage claim.  There are a few cases in which the 
debtors owed secured debts greater than $50,000, but the trustee claim record did not identify it as a 
mortgage debt.  It seems likely that some of these claims were mortgage claims, but we did not exclude 
them as they were not identified as mortgage claims.  The number of these claims is so small that their 
inclusion would not materially affect the analyses.
22
  The form petition, Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs do not ask the debtor to indicate gender 
(or race).  See Official Bankruptcy Forms 1, 6 & 7.  Gender must be inferred from the debtor’s first name.  
It was not possible to make even an educated guess about a debtor’s gender in only 18 cases.  
23
  The percentage as well as absolute numbers of women filing for bankruptcy relief has increased over 
time.  See Elizabeth Warren, What Is a Women’s Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, and Other Gender-
Neutral Topics, 25 Harv. Women’s L. J. 19, __ & n. 40 (2002) (reporting findings of 2001 study of Chapter 
7 and Chapter 13 debtors in five judicial districts; 39% of petitions were by women filing alone, 28.8% by 
men filing alone, and 32.0% by husband and wife filing jointly); Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay 
L. Westbrook, The Fragile Middle Class (Yale 2000) 36-37 (study of debtors in 16 judicial districts who 
filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 in 1991; finding that 30% of petitions were filed by 
women, 26% were filed by men, and 44% were joint petitions; and reporting that proportion of petitions 
filed by women, men and jointly was about the same in Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 cases);  Teresa Sullivan 
& Elizabeth Warren, The Changing Demographics of Bankruptcy, Norton Bankruptcy Law Advisor (Oct. 
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Table 1.  Gender of Petitioners
Gender Number
Percent of all 
Petitioners
Female 273 36.3% 
Male 276 36.7% 
Joint 203 27.0% 
Total 752 (43 missing24) 100.00%
2. Household Size
Table 2 reports that the average household size of the debtors in the sample was 
2.69.  Household size is the sum of the petitioner(s) and any dependents.  Dependents 
include any children in a joint filing, and any spouse or child in a single filing.  The 
median household size was 2.  For joint petitioners, the mean and median were 
significantly higher than for all debtors, 3.61 and 4, respectively.  Female petitioners’ 
households were slightly larger on average than male petitioners’, 2.39 compared to 2.32.
Table 2.  Household Size of Petitioners by Gender
Petitioner Gender N Range Mean SD SEM 25% Median 75%
Female 274 1-7 2.39 1.32 0.08 1 2 3
Male 277 1-11 2.32 1.55 0.093 1 2 3
Joint 203 1-8 3.61 1.34 0.094 2 4 4
All25 770 1-11 2.69 1.52 0.055 1 2 4
missing 25
Table 3 reports the frequency of occurrence of each household size between 1 and 
11 of the cases in the sample.  Just over one quarter of all households were comprised of 
only the debtor, while nearly another quarter were comprised of two persons.  
Approximately 37% of households were comprised of three or four persons, including the 
debtor.  Only 12.2% of the households were comprised of more than four persons.
1999), at 1-7 (also reporting results of study of chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases in 2001, finding nearly 39% 
of filings were by women, 33% joint, and 29% by men); Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the 
Numbers: Demographics of Chapter 7 Debtors, Am. Bankr. Inst. J., Sept. 1999, at 24 (reporting on survey 
by Executive Office for United States Trustees of 1,452 no-asset chapter 7 cases filed in late 1998 or early 
1999, and finding that 34.6% of cases were filed by women, 29.5% by men, and 35% by joint petitioners); 
Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Bankruptcy and the Family, Families and Law 
(ed: Lisa J. McIntyre, and Marvin B. Sussman) The Haworth Press, Inc., 1995, 193, 207 (also reporting on 
the 1991 study of debtors in the Consumer Bankruptcy Project).
24
  Includes 18 cases in which gender could not be determined, and 25 other missing cases.
25
  Includes 18 cases in which the gender of the individual petitioner was uncertain.
12
Table 3.  Household Size of Petitioners (frequency)
Household Size Number Percent
1 198 25.9%
2 188 24.6%
3 161 21.0% 
4 124 16.2% 
5 62 8.1%
6-11 32 4.2%
total 765 (30 missing) 100%
3. Number of Dependents
As to be expected, the data on number of dependants closely parallel the data on 
household size.  Table 4 reports that the mean number of dependents was 1.25.  The 
mean for joint petitioners, 1.65, was significantly higher than for male and female 
petitioners filing individually (0.99 and 1.2, respectively).  The mean for female 
petitioners was somewhat higher than for male petitioners, 1.2 versus 0.99.  These latter 
figures probably obscure, however, that there are more children in cases filed by women 
individually than in cases filed by men individually,26 but our data on the point are not 
complete.  
Table 4.  Number of Dependents by Gender
Petitioner Gender N Range Mean SD SEM 25% Median 75%
Female 273 0-6 1.2 1.23 0.074 0 1 2
Male 276 0-9 0.99 1.3 0.078 0 1 2
Joint 203 0-6 1.65 1.31 0.092 0 2 2
All (incl. "unsure") 770 0-9 1.25 1.3 0.047 0 1 2
missing 25
Table 5 reports the frequency of occurrence of each number of dependents from 
one to nine.  Nearly 38% of filers had no dependents.  Eighty-four percent of households 
included two or fewer dependents, while only 16% had three or more.
26
  See Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1003 (2002) (reporting findings from Phase 
III of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, an empirical study of 1250 cases in five judicial districts, that 
bankruptcy filing rates for unmarried women are much higher than for married couples or for unmarried 
men).
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Table 5.  Number of Dependents per Household (frequency)







Total 765 (30 missing cases) 100%
B. Income and Indebtedness
1. Debtor and Household Income
Table 6 reports on debtor and household, annual gross and net incomes, in 1994 
dollars, as of the time of Chapter 13 filing.27 The mean and median annual gross incomes 
of the individual debtors in the sample were $20,578 and $18,396, respectively, and their
mean and median annual net incomes were $16,824 and $15,180.  The mean and median 
annual gross incomes of the debtor households were $25,274 and $22,314, respectively, 
while the mean and median annual net incomes of the debtor households were $20,571 
and $18,246.28 That the means are somewhat greater than the medians indicates that 
some debtors and households had relatively higher incomes that increased the overall 
means. The standard deviation29 of the debtors’ annual gross incomes, $11,205, is 
moderate – approximately one-half the mean – indicating a moderately wide variation in 
debtor gross incomes.  For household annual gross income, the standard deviation, 
$13,816, also is moderate – again, nearly half the mean – again indicating a moderately 
wide variation in debtor household incomes.  The standard error of the mean (SEM30)
indicates that the true mean debtor annual gross income in the population was between 
27 These data were obtained from Schedule I (“Current Income of Individual Debtors”) of the debtors’ 
Schedules of Assets and Liabilities.  See Form 6, Official Bankruptcy Forms.  Schedule I requires the 
debtor to state the debtor’s monthly gross income and payroll deductions; and the debtor’s spouse’s 
monthly gross income and payroll deductions, if the debtor is married, regardless of whether the petition 
was a joint petition with the spouse.  Thus, as used here, net income refers to gross income minus payroll 
deductions; and household income refers to the combined incomes of the debtor and any spouse.
28
  The median and mean gross incomes of the debtors in the Chapter 13 Project were remarkably similar 
to, albeit slightly more than, those of the debtors studied by Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook in The Fragile 
Middle Class (Yale 2000), pp. 61-68 & Table 2.3.  The Fragile Middle Class studied debtors in 16 judicial 
districts who filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 in 1991.  The median and mean incomes 
of the debtor households, in 1994 dollars, adjusted for comparison to the Chapter 13 Project sample, were 
$19,542 and $22,099, respectively, compared to $22,314 and $25,274 for the debtors in the Chapter 13 
Project.  The SWW figures include both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filers.  Because Chapter 13 debtors have 
higher average incomes than Chapter 7 debtors, it is expected that the figures for Chapter 13 debtors in the 
Chapter 13 Project would be somewhat higher.
29
  The standard deviation is a measure of variability within the sample.  In a statistically normal 
distribution, 68% of all scores are within one standard deviation of the mean, however, the debtor and 
household incomes are not normally distributed in the Project sample.
30
  The standard error of the mean (SEM) is a measure of the reliability of the sample mean’s ability to 
estimate the “true mean” of the population.  The range within which the true mean of the population falls, 
at a 95% level of confidence, is the mean of the sample, plus or minus 1.96 times the SEM. 
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$10,409 and $12,001.  As to mean household annual gross income, the confidence 
interval of the estimate of mean is $12,830-$14,802.31
The 25th and 75th percentile amounts provide further insight into the diversity 
among debtors with respect to personal and household, annual gross and net incomes.
Twenty-five percent (25%) of debtors had annual gross income below $13,110, and 
annual net income below $11,040.  Twenty-five percent had annual gross income above 
$26,220, and annual net income above only $21,192.  The household annual gross 
income figures are very similar to the debtor annual gross income numbers at the 25th and 
75th percentiles: 25% of households had annual gross income below $13,077 and 25% 
had more than $26,436.
The debtor households in the study sample were markedly less affluent than the 
U.S. population as a whole.  In 1994, the mean and median household incomes in the 
United States were $50,961 and $38,119, respectively,32 compared to $25,274 and 
$22,314 for the debtor households.  That is, the mean debtor household annual income 
was less than half the mean for all households; and the median was less than 60% of that 
for all households.
Table 6.  Debtor and Household, Annual Gross and Net Income
N Range Mean SD SEM 25% Median 75%
Debtor Annual 
Gross Income
761 $0-$66,39333 $20,578 $11,205 $406 $13,110 $18,396 $26,220
Debtor Annual 
Net Income
763 $0-$56,40034 $16,824 $8,657 $313 $11,040 $15,180 $21,192 
Household 
Annual Gross 
Income 754 $0-$78,32435 $25,274 $13,816 $503 $14,991 $22,314 $32,523 
Household 
Annual Net 
Income 754 $0-$65,10036 $20,571 $10,502 $382 $13,077 $18,246 $26,436 
31 Naturally, debtor and household annual net incomes, were much less than the gross.  As reported in 
Table 5, the mean and median debtor annual net incomes were $16,824 and $15,180, respectively, or 
18.3% and 17.5%, respectively, less than the mean and median debtor annual gross incomes.  Likewise, the 
mean and median debtor household annual net incomes were $20,571 and $18,246, respectively, or 18.7% 
and 18.2%, respectively, less than the mean and median household gross incomes.  
32
  See, e.g., Money and Income in the United States, Current Population Reports, Consumer Income, U.S. 
Census Bureau (Sept. 2002), Appendix A, Table A-1, p. 21 (available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p60-218.pdf) (last visited Dec. 14, 2004).
33
  All income amounts > $66,393 (M + 3.0 SD) were excluded from descriptive procedures.
34
  All income amounts > $56,400 (M + 3.0 SD) were excluded from descriptive and inferential procedures.
35
  All income amounts > $78,324 (M + 3.0 SD) were excluded from descriptive and inferential procedures.
36
  All income amounts > $65,100 (M + 3.0 SD) were excluded from descriptive and inferential procedures.
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2. Income and Gender
The data reveal statistically significant differences in income based on the 
debtor’s gender.  As shown in Table 7 below, female petitioners reported significantly 
less annual income than either male or joint petitioners.  Male petitioners reported the 
highest incomes.  Female petitioners reported mean and median annual income of 
$15,060 and $14,220, respectively, compared to $16,848 and $15,516 for joint 
petitioners, and $18,461 and $16,848 for male petitioners.  While the proximity of the 
mean and median values within each of the three groups indicates fairly symmetrical 
distributions in the trimmed data, the amount of variance within each group was still 
substantial.37
Table 7.  Annual Gross Income by Gender of Petitioner
Gender of 
Petitioner N Range Mean SD SEM 25% Median 75%
Female 271 $0-$48,20438 $15,060 $7,476 $454 $10,308 $14,220 $18,528 
Joint 199 $0-$52,24839 $16,848 $8,485 $602 $11,328 $15,516 $21,168 
Male 276 $0-$66,06040 $18,461 $9,259 $557 $11,616 $16,848 $23,724 
3. Debtor Indebtedness
Table 8 below reports the range, mean, median, and 10th, 25th, 75th  and 90th
percentile amounts of the allowed secured, priority, general, and total claims against the 
debtors in the study sample in 1994 dollars. The figures for secured claims do not 
include post filing mortgage debts, but do include pre-filing mortgage arrearage claims.41
For each type of debt, and total debt, the mean substantially exceeds the median, 
indicating that a relatively few cases with relatively large claims increased the overall 
debtor averages.  The standard deviations likewise indicate a very wide spread in the 
amount of debt carried by the debtors in the sample cases.
The mean total debt (excluding post filing mortgage balances) was over $24,000, 
while the median amount was nearly $16,000 and the standard deviation was $32,755.  
37 A small number of cases (n < 40) reported gross and net incomes that were substantially greater than the 
mean of their respective samples.  The cases that were more than three standard deviations above their 
respective sample means were excluded from further analyses.  A Kruskal-Wallis, non-parametric analysis 
indicated that female petitioners reported significantly lower annual income than the overall sample median 
annual income, P2(2, N = 754) = 16.74, p # .001; and that female petitioners reported significantly lower 
annual household income than the overall sample median annual household income, P2(2, N = 749) = 83.1, 
p # .001. 
38
  All income amounts > $48,204 (M +3.0 SD) were excluded from descriptive and inferential procedures.
39
  All income amounts > $52,248 (M +3.0 SD) were excluded from descriptive and inferential procedures.
40
  All income amounts > $66,060 (M +3.0 SD) were excluded from descriptive and inferential procedures.
41
  As discussed above, supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text, some trustees include non-arrearage 
mortgage debts in their record of creditor claims, while others do not.  Thus, in order to achieve consistency 
in the computation of allowed secured claims across trusteeships and debtors, we excluded long-term 
mortgage claims in calculating amount of secured debt for all debtors.  
16
The median and 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th percentile amounts of total debt further illustrate 
the spread among debtors in total debt, with a positive skew to the distribution.  The 
figures for standard error of the mean indicate a high level of confidence that the mean 
debt amounts in the sample approximate the mean debt amounts in the entire population 
of debtors.
For most debtors, most allowed debt was secured debt.  The mean amount of 
secured debt (excluding non-arrearage mortgage claims) was $11,593, with a median of 
$7,178 and a standard deviation of $20,395.  
The distribution of priority debt was highly skewed.  Most debtors had no priority 
debt, while a few owed very large priority debts.  The mean was $1,857, while the 10th
percentile, 25th percentile and median amounts of priority debt were $0.  The 75th
percentile amount was only $925.  The 90th percentile was $3,823, confirming that a very 
few debtors owed very large amounts of priority debt.
Table 8 is most reliable as to the debtors’ general unsecured indebtedness.  The 
mean amount of allowed unsecured debt was $9,958, and the median was $5,143, 
indicating that some debtors owed much more unsecured debt than most.42  The standard 
deviation for unsecured debt was very large, more than two times the mean, confirming 
the very large spread among debtors in amounts of unsecured indebtedness.
42
  The Project did not investigate what types of debt comprised the debtors’ unsecured indebtedness.  In 
Collecting Debts from the Ill and Injured: The Rhetorical Significance, but Practical Irrelevance, of 
Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 Am. U. L. Rev. 229 (2001), Professor Melissa Jacoby reports that 48.3% 
of Chapter 13 cases in an eight-judicial-district study of debtors who filed for bankruptcy in 1999 were 
“medical-related,” that is, the debtors had at least $1000 in health-related bills and/or reported illness or 
injury as a cause of their filing.  See also David U. Himmelstein, Elizabeth Warren, Deborah Thorne, 
Steffie Woolhandler, Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy (forthcoming) (same eight-judicial-
district study, reporting that 46.2% of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases were medical-related); Melissa B. 
Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates over Health Care Financing: 
Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 375, 389-90 (2001) (same); Melissa B. Jacoby,
Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, Medical Problems and Bankruptcy Filings, Norton Bankruptcy Law 
Advisor (May 2000), p 4, Figure 2 (same study, finding 45.6% of debtors had either medical reason for 
filing or substantial medical debt).
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Table 8.  Debtor Indebtedness-Allowed Claims43
Allowed 
Claims N
# cases with 
value = $0 Range Mean SD SEM 10% 25% Median 75% 90%
Secured
787 (8 
missing) 121 (15%) $0 - $376577 $11,593 $20,395 727 $0 $1,707 $7,178 $14,733 $26,040
Priority
783 (12 
missing) 462 (59%) $0 - $115406 $1,857 $7,124 254.58 $0 $0 $0 $925 $3,823
General
782 (13 
missing) 86 (11%) $0 - $257377 $9,958 $19,976 714.34 $0 $1,364 $5,143 $10,615 $20,953
Total
772 (23 
missing) 33 (4%) $0 - $432084 $24,294 $32,755 1178.86 $2,849 $8,112 $15,865 $28,914 $51,059
4. Debt-Income Ratio
Debt-to-income ratio is a primary measure of debtor financial distress; the higher 
the ratio, the more burdened was the debtor with debt, and less able to pay that debt from 
current income.44  As reported in Table 9 below, the mean debt-annual net income ratio
of the debtors in the study, excluding long-term mortgage debt, was 1.29.45 That is, the 
average debtor would have to devote all income for a period of more than 15 months to 
pay short-term debt, without reserving any income for payment of long-term mortgage 
debt or other living expenses such as rent, food, health care, transportation, and utilities.  
The median ratio was 0.965, indicating that one half of the debtors had debts greater than 
nearly one year’s net income, while one half had debts of less than one year’s net income; 
and that a relatively few debtors with very high debt-income ratios pulled up the overall 
mean amount.
The 75th percentile debt-to-annual income ratio was 1.699, indicating a sizable 
group of debtors with huge debt burdens. At the other end, the 25th percentile debt-
43
  This Table includes “other claims” in Total Allowed Claims, but does not separately report such claims, 
because fewer than 10% of the cases included “other claims” and different trustees classified different sorts 
of claims as “other claims.”
As indicated in the bottom row of this Table, there were 33 cases in which there were no allowed 
claims.  Most or all of these cases were cases in which there were scheduled claims, but no allowed claims.  
All but six of the 33 cases were dismissed before confirmation.  If only cases with confirmed plans are 
considered in computing allowed claims, the means change minimally and are well within the margins of 
error of the means reported in the Table.  Excluding cases dismissed or converted before confirmation of a 
plan, the mean secured debt was $11,257, the mean priority debt was $1,514, the mean unsecured debt was 
$10,636, and the mean total debt was $24,381.    
44
  Of course, debt-income ratio is not always an accurate indicator of financial distress; it does not account 
for assets and savings, which also may be used to pay debt.  While acknowledging that debt-income ratios 
historically have closely paralleled consumer bankruptcy filing rates, Professor Todd Zywicki has argued 
that this “purported measurement [of debtor financial distress] is illogical” because debtors owe a mix of 
debts, some of which are to be paid over extended periods of time.  He maintains that the better measure of 
debtor financial distress is “equity insolvency,” which is a debtor’s ability to pay debts as they come due.  
See Todd Zywicki, Why So Many Bankruptcies and What To Do About It: An Economic Analysis of 
Consumer Bankruptcy law and Bankruptcy Reform, Law and Economics Working Paper Series, George 
Mason University School of Law, pp. 16-25, 65 (draft on file with the author).
45
  (SEM = .041).  The figures are based on allowed claims, so may slightly understate the extent of debtor 
indebtedness because not all creditors file their claims.  On the other hand, the trustee claims information 
did not always specify whether a secured claim was secured by a mortgage, automobile, or other collateral, 
thus a few mortgage claims likely are included in the figures.
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income ratio was 0.558; 25% of the debtors had somewhat less than twice as much 
annual net income as non-mortgage debt.  However, these debtors’ financial distress is 
greater than appears from the debt-income ratio.  The debtors in this group tended to have 
more dependents and more people living in the household, and lower incomes, than the 
other debtors in the sample.  Of 181 cases in the 25th percentile, 40% had two or more 
dependents, and 35% had four or more people living in the household.  These cases 
represent 83% of the 218 cases in the overall sample with four or more people in the 
household. Additionally, 45% of these cases were by women filing singly, compared to 
36.3% in the overall sample of the study; and only 8% of these cases were joint filings, 
compared to 27% in the overall sample. The median gross annual household income for 
these cases was $20,796, and the median net annual household income was $17,160.
These figures compare to the weighted-average poverty level for a household of four in 
1994 of $15,141;46 in other words, most of these cases with lower debt-annual net income 
ratios were near or below the poverty level.47
The debt-income ratios of the debtors covered by the Chapter 13 Project are 
comparable to the debt-income ratios of the Chapter 13 debtors studied by Professors 
Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook.  In their study of debtors who filed for Chapter 13 
relief in 1991 in 10 judicial districts in Illinois, Pennsylvania and Texas, they found a 
mean debt-income ratio, excluding mortgage debt, of 1.01 and a median of 0.74,48
compared to 1.29 and 0.965, respectively, for debtors in the Chapter 13 Project.  The 
debt-income ratios for the debtors in the Chapter 13 Project also were similar to those of 
the debtors in a study of Mississippi Chapter 13 cases filed between 1992 and 1998, who 
had a mean debt-income ratio of 1.41 and a median of 1.23.49
46
 U.S. Census Bureau; (available at www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld/thresh94.html, checked on 
May 5, 2005)
47
 The poverty levels were established by the USDA and are adjusted by annual growth in the Consumer 
Price Index each year. Because certain costs, such as medical and transportation expenses, have grown at a 
rate greater than CPI inflation, many agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control, now adjust the U.S. 
poverty figures upwards to 129% of values published by the Census Bureau. Using this adjustment, the 
poverty level for a household of four was $19,531 in 1994.
48
  Teresa A. Sullivan, et al., Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer 
Bankrupts 1981-1991, 68 Am. Bankr. L. J. 121, 124 (1994).  The standard deviation was 0.97, 25th
percentile 0.4, and 75th percentile 1.32.  In their previous study of debtors who filed for relief in 1981 in 10 
of the same judicial districts, Professors Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook found a mean debt-income ratio 
for Chapter 13 debtors, including mortgage debt, of 1.47 with a standard deviation of 7.45, a 25th percentile 
of 0.36, a median of 0.62, and a 75th percentile of 1.02.  See Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Folklore and Facts: A 
Preliminary Report from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, 60 Am. Bankr. L. J. 293, 324 (1986).  The 
mean debt-income ratio found for debtors in the Chapter 13 Project were well within the standard 
deviations of the means found by Professors Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook in their two studies.  
In their study of debtors who filed for Chapter 13 relief in 1981 in 10 judicial districts in Illinois, 
Pennsylvania and Texas, they found a mean and median ratio of non mortgage debt to income of 1.48 and 
0.96, respectively, for their sample of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors.  Teresa A. Sullivan, et al., The 
Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt (Yale 2000) at 71, table 2.5.
49
  Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy’s New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt 
Collection in Chapter 13, 7 A.B.I. L. Rev. 415, 456-457 (1999).  The Mississippi study included some 
mortgage debt in the computation of debt-income ratios.
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The debt-annual net income ratios (excluding long-term mortgage debt) naturally 
were somewhat lower when the entire household was taken into account.  The mean 
household debt-annual income ratio was 1.07, with a median of 0.855 and standard 
deviation of 0.904.
Table 9.  Debt-Annual Net Income Ratios (Excluding Long-Term Mortgage Debt)
N Range Mean SD SEM 25% Median 75%
Debtor D-ANI ratio 746 (49 missing) 0 - 25.1750 1.29 1.115 0.041 0.558 0.965 1.699
Debtor Household D-
ANI ratio 743 (52 missing) 0 - 25.1751 1.07 0.904 0.033 0.479 0.855 1.409
An analysis of the sample debtors’ debt-annual net income ratios by district 
revealed a significant relation.52  As reflected in Figure 1 below, debtors in the Western 
District of Pennsylvania and Southern District of Georgia had significantly higher debt-
annual net income ratios than debtors in the Western District of Tennessee, Middle 
District of Tennessee, and District of Maryland.53
Figure 1.  Mean Debtor Debt-Annual Net Income Ratio by District



















Overall Mean D-ANI ratio (1.27)
Error Bars represent +1 SEM
50
  All ratios > 5.57 (M + 3 SD) were excluded from subsequent descriptive and inferential procedures.
51
  All ratios > 6.76 (M + 3 SD) were excluded from subsequent descriptive and inferential procedures.
52 F (6,721) = 6.70, p  .001, 2 = .053.
53
 These post hoc analyses were performed using Dunnett’s T3 test due to the inequality of variances 
revealed by Levene’s test.
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There was likewise a significant relation between district and debtor household 
debt-annual net income ratios.54  As shown in Figure 2, the Southern District of Georgia 
had significantly higher household debt-annual net income ratios than all other districts 
except the Western District of Pennsylvania.55
Figure 2.  Mean Debtor Household Debt-Annual Net Income Ratio by District



















Overall Mean D-ANI ratio (1.07)
Error Bars represent +1 SEM
5. Home Ownership
Approximately 54% of the debtors in the study were homeowners,56 compared to 
the national rate of homeownership in 1994 of 64%.57 The rate of debtor homeownership 
in the Chapter 13 Project is again similar to that found in other studies of consumer 
54 F (6,733) = 9.15, p  .001, 2 = .069.
55
 These post hoc analyses were performed using Dunnett’s T3 test due to the inequality of variances 
revealed by Levene’s test.
56
  Neither the Schedules, Official Bankruptcy Form 6, nor the Statement of Financial Affairs, Official 
Bankruptcy Form 7, includes any direct question regarding homeownership.  We inferred home ownership 
from whether the debtor scheduled a mortgage or mobile home debt.  Thus, the rate of home ownership 
reported here may be understated; some debtors may have owned homes without any mortgage, and some 
mortgage or mobile home creditors may not have been identifiable as such.  427, or 54%, of the cases 
indicated a mortgage or mobile home debt.  We identified 16 mobile home debts in MDNC, 7 in NDGA, 5 
in SDGA and 1 each in MD and MDTN.  In MDTN, we identified 42 debtors with mortgage debt, but 
further estimated that roughly 25 real estate mortgages were listed as priority instead of secured debts.  The 
remaining 372 homeowners were identified as having mortgage debts.  
57
  Robert R. Callis, Current Housing Reports, Moving to America – Moving to Home Ownership: 1994-
2002, U.S. Census Bureau (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/h121-03-1.pdf
(last visited Dec. 27, 2004).
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bankruptcy filings.  In their 1991 study of debtors in 16 judicial districts in California, 
Tennessee, Illinois, Pennsylvania and Texas, Professors Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook 
found that about half of the debtors owned a home.58
There were substantial variations in homeownership rates among the seven 
districts.  As shown in Table 10, homeownership rates ranged from a low of only 33% --
just half the national rate for all Americans – in the Middle District of Tennessee to 79% 
in the Western District of Pennsylvania.  These substantial variations imply very different 
uses of Chapter 13 by debtors in the different districts, that is, that debtors in the Western 
District of Pennsylvania used Chapter 13 primarily for dealing with mortgage defaults, 
while the great majority of debtors in the Middle District of Tennessee, and nearly half of 
the debtors in the Northern and Southern Districts of Georgia and the Western District of 
Tennessee, sought Chapter 13 relief for other reasons.59
Table 10.  Frequency of Homeownership by District
District Do not own home (percent) Homeowner (percent)
MD 42 (42%) 58 (58%)
MDNC 43 (43%) 57 (57%)
MDTN 67 (67%) 33 (33%)
NDGA 83 (50%) 82 (50%)
SDGA 49 (49%) 51 (51%)
WDPA 21 (21%) 79 (79%)
WDTN 63 (48%) 67 (52%) 60
Total 368 (46%) 427 (54%)
C. Previous and Subsequent Bankruptcy Filings
The study also investigated bankruptcy filings by the debtors before and after the 
sample case.  Data were obtained from two sources: the Statement of Financial Affairs, 
which requires the debtor to disclose any previous filings; and electronic searches of each 
district’s PACER database.  The available data probably somewhat understate the 
58 Teresa A. Sullivan, et al., The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt (Yale 2000) at 204.  See also 
Norberg, supra note 49, at 457-58 (finding that approximately 60% of Chapter 13 debtors filing between 
1992 and 1998 in the Southern District of Mississippi were homeowners); Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth 
Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS (1989) (hereinafter AWFOD), at 129 
(reporting on study of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases filed in 1991 in 10 judicial districts in Texas, 
Pennsylvania and Illinois; finding that 52% of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors were homeowners).  Cf. 
Ed Flynn and Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, . . . Be it ever so humble, there’s no place like 
home, http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/press/articles/abi_08_2003.htm (reporting national home ownership rate of 
42% for Chapter 7 debtors in 5,832 cases filed between 1999 and 2001, with variations among states 
ranging from 27% to 60.4%); and Ed Flynn and Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, The Class 
of 2000, ABI J. (Oct. 2001) (reporting 41.8% home ownership rate for Chapter 7 debtors in 1,931 no-asset 
Chapter 7 cases filed in 2000). 
59 A chi-square analysis indicated differential rates of homeownership across the districts studied, P2 (6, N
= 795) = 67.09,  p # .001. The homeownership rate in MDTN (32.0%) was lower than expected, and 
homeownership rates in MD (57%), MDNC (58%) and WDPA (79.0%) were higher than expected. 
However, chi-square analysis did not reveal a significant relationship between homeowner status and case 
disposition, P2 (4, N = 795) = .664, p = .956.
60
  Includes 25 cases in which mortgage debt apparently was listed as priority debt.
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incidence of other bankruptcy filings by the sample debtors.  The PACER databases 
reach back before 1994 by no more than five years, and are more limited in some districts 
than others; indeed, the PACER system reaches back only one or two years before 1994 
in several of the sample districts.61  Thus, many previous filings were ascertainable only 
from the debtor’s disclosure in the Statement of Financial Affairs, which is not entirely
reliable on this point.62  Further, the PACER searches for subsequent filings were done in 
2002, so that any filings after that time are not included in the data set; and the district 
PACER systems are not connected to a national database, and therefore do not reveal 
when a debtor has filed a petition in another jurisdiction.  The searches also might have 
missed some cases in which the sample case was a joint filing, but a previous or 
subsequent filing was an individual filing, or vice versa. 
1. Other Filings (Previous or Subsequent to the Sample Case)
Among the most remarkable findings of the Project is that at least half of all of the 
Chapter 13 debtors in the sample had filed one or more bankruptcy cases in addition to 
the sample case.  As shown in Figure 3, the available data reveal that half of the debtors 
had filed only the sample case, while nearly 30% had filed one other case; 10% had filed 
two other cases; and 10% had filed three or more other cases.63 (In Part VI below, we 
consider the relation between other filings and outcome in the sample case.)
61
  The following chart indicates the reach of the PACER system in each district for ascertaining previous 
bankruptcy filings:
NDGA SDGA MDTN WDTN MDNC WDPA DMD
1992 1989 ??? 1991 1993 ??? 1990
62
  Comparison of the debtors’ statements of financial affairs to the PACER search results in the Mississippi 
study found that nearly 25% of debtors who had filed a previous petition did not report it in their statement 
of financial affairs in the sample case.  Norberg, supra note 49, at 458 and n. 128.
63
  These Project findings are consistent with findings reported by Jean M. Lown, “Serial Bankruptcy: A 
20-Year Study of Utah Filers,” Am. Bankr. Inst. J. (Feb. 2006), at 24-25, 68-69.  Professor Lown’s study 
examined repeat filings by debtors filing for bankruptcy relief in Utah in 1997.  She found that 10.7% of 
the debtors had filed three times within two years or four or more times within 20 years.  (She did not 
report in this article on the numbers of repeat filers who had filed fewer than three times within two years 
or four times in 20 years.)   
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Figure 3. Sample Cases With Record of Other Filings

























Table 11 below provides additional detail regarding the number of previous and 
subsequent filings by the debtors in the sample cases.  Nearly 32% of the debtors had one 
or more previous filings;64 approximately 22% had filed one previous case, and 
approximately 7% had filed two or more previous cases.  Approximately 33% of the 
debtors have filed one or more times subsequent to the sample case; the available data are 
that nearly 22% of all debtors have filed one later case, and more than 11% have filed 
two or more subsequent cases by 2002.  
64
  Compare  Norberg, supra note 49, at 458 and n. 128 (approximately 39% of debtors in sample of 
Chapter 13 cases filed between 1994 and 1998 in Southern District of Mississippi filed one or more 
previous cases); Susan L DeJarnatt, Once is Not Enough: Preserving Consumers’ Rights to Bankruptcy 
Protection, 74 Ind. L. J. 445, 480 (1999) (reporting that repeat filers ranged from less than 5% up to 40% of 
all Chapter 13 filers, based on survey completed by 62 of 179 standing Chapter 13 trustees in 1996 or 
1997).  It appears that some of the Chapter 13 trustees surveyed by Professor DeJarnatt may have 
substantially underestimated the numbers of repeat filers in their districts.  Professor DeJarnatt  identifies 
the responding trustees by state, not district within a state.  According to her survey, two trustees in 
Tennessee estimated that less than 10% of their total caseload was repeat filings, and two others reported 
that repeat filings were between 31% and 40% of total caseload, id. at 480, compared to the 26% and 51% 
rates of previous filings reported in Figure 5 below for the Middle and Western Districts of Tennessee, 
respectively, in the Chapter 13 Project.  Likewise, she reported a 6-10% repeat filing rate estimated by a 
trustee in Pennsylvania, compared to 24% found in the Chapter 13 Project for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania; and fewer than 5% estimated by a trustee in North Carolina, compared to 20% in MDNC in 
the Project.  See also Harry H. Haden, Chapter XIII Wage Earner Plans – Forgotten Man Bankruptcy, 55 
Ky. L. J. 564, 594-95 (1966) (reporting that 66% of wage earner petitions filed in Birmingham, Ala., in one 
year were by repeat filers).
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Table 11.  Previous and Subsequent Filings

















































































2. Other Filings – District Comparisons
The data indicate a statistically significant relation between judicial district and 
incidence of other filings.  As reflected in Figure 4 below, 20% of the debtors in the 
Middle District of North Carolina had filed one or more subsequent cases, compared to 
39% and 56% of the debtors in the Middle District of Tennessee and the Western District
of Tennessee, respectively, and the overall subsequent filing rate of 33% for all debtors in 
all seven districts.65
The data sets on previous filings vary by district, therefore any conclusion 
regarding the relation between judicial district and incidence of previous filings is not 
possible.  The PACER database for the Middle District of North Carolina reaches back 
only one year before the sample cases, compared to two or more years in the other six 
districts.        
65 2(6, N = 793) = 47.16, p  .001.
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Figure 4.  Subsequent Refiling Rates by District






















ge Overall Subsequent Filing 
3. Abuse by Repeat Filers?
The data reported above in Figures 3-4 and Table 11 clearly suggest that there is a 
cadre of debtors who have misused the bankruptcy system with repeat filings.  More than 
10% of the debtors in the sample have filed four or more cases, including the sample 
case, and over 5% have filed five or more cases.  At the extreme, one debtor has filed no 
fewer than 12 cases, four preceding the sample case and seven thereafter; another debtor 
has filed eight other cases, two previous and six subsequent to the sample case; another 
has seven previous filings; and another has filed one previous and six subsequent cases.  
Abuse in these cases appears manifest.  In the more common cases, however, in which 
the debtor has filed one or two other petitions, abuse is much more difficult to infer.  As 
discussed in the following section, the Project data base includes information on the 
chapter of the debtors’ other filing(s), the disposition of such case(s), and the length of 
time between filings.  While this data adds some detail to the portrait of the sample 
debtors’ use of the consumer bankruptcy system, it sheds little light on whether the 
debtors with one or two other filings have abused the system.  Perhaps the best available 
insight into the propriety of other filings comes from the analyses in Part V.B below of 
the relation between other filings and case outcome.66
66
  See also Susan L DeJarnatt, Once is Not Enough: Preserving Consumers’ Rights to Bankruptcy 
Protection, 74 Ind. L. J. 445, 480 (1999) (reporting results of survey of 62 of 179 standing Chapter 13 
trustees; 26 of 62 trustees reported that there was abuse in fewer than 10% of repeat filings, while 24 
reported abuse in more than 20% of all repeat filings); Jean M. Lown, “Serial Bankruptcy: A 20-Year 
Study of Utah Filers,” Am. Bankr. Inst. J. (Feb. 2006), at 24-25, 68-69 (finding that 10.7% of debtors who 
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4. Chapter, Timing and Outcome of Other Filings
a. Chapter of Other Filings
The large majority of the debtors’ other bankruptcy filings were also under 
Chapter 13.  As reported in Table 12, the available data indicate that, of the debtors who 
had filed a single previous petition, over 80% of those for whom the chapter of the 
previous filing is known filed the previous case under Chapter 13.  Likewise, as reported 
in Table 13, of the debtors who have filed a single subsequent petition, over 75% filed the 
later case under Chapter 13.  
Table 12.  Chapter of Previous Bankruptcy Filing
N
% of 2d 
time 
filers67
% of all 
debtors 
No Previous Filings  560 ----- 70.4%
One Previous Filing 178 ----- 22.4
Under Chapter 7  26 19.0% 3.3%
Under Chapter 13  110 80.3% 13.8%
Under Chapter 11 1 0.7% 0.1%
Missing 41 ----- -----
More than One Previous Filing 57 ----- 7.2%
Total 795
filed for bankruptcy relief in Utah in 1997 were serial filers and possible abusers, having filed three times 
within two years or four or more times within 20 years).  
67
  Excluding missing cases.
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% of all 
debtors 
No Subsequent Filings  534 ----- 67.2%
One Subsequent Filing 172 ----- 21.6%
Under Chapter 7   29 24.8% 3.6%
Under Chapter 13 88 75.2% 11.0%
missing 55 ----- -----
More than One Subsequent Filing  89 ----- 11.2%
Total 795
b. Timing of Other Filings
The bulk of the sample debtors’ other filings occurred within a year before the 
filing of the sample case, or a year after the final disposition of the sample case.  As 
reported in Table 14, of the debtors who had filed a single previous petition, the great 
majority – over 75% -- filed the sample case within a year of the dismissal of the 
previous case.  As reported in Table 15, of the debtors who had filed a single subsequent 
petition, a large majority – 65% -- filed the later case within a year of the disposition of 
the sample case.
Table 14.  Interval Between Disposition of Previous Case and Filing of Sample Case
Interval 











  Excluding missing cases.
28
Table 15.  Interval Between Disposition of Sample Case and Filing of Subsequent
Case
Interval 










c. Outcome of Other Filings
Table 16 below reports that, nearly 75% of the previous cases filed by the debtors 
with one previous bankruptcy filing were either dismissed or converted; and that 25% of 
these debtors had obtained a discharge in the previous case.  Table 17 reports that, 40.6% 
of the later cases filed by the debtors with one subsequent filing had been dismissed or 
converted by the time of our review of the PACER data bases; 31% went to discharge, 
and 27.6% were still pending as of the time of the PACER search.  
Table 16.  Outcome in Previous Case (regardless of chapter)
Number % of 2nd time filers % of all debtors
discharged 35 25.5% 4.4%
dismissed 96 70.1% 12.1%
converted 6 4.4% 0.1%
total
178
(41 missing cases) 100.00%
Table 17.  Outcome in Subsequent Case (regardless of chapter)
Number
% of one-time 
subsequent filers % of all debtors
Discharged 36 31.0% 4.5%
Dismissed 47 40.5% 5.9%
Converted 1 0.1% 0.1%
Open 32 27.6% 4.0%
total
172 
(56 missing cases) 100.00%
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5. Filings After Discharge in the Sample Case
Of the 262 debtors who obtained a discharge in the sample cases, 14.9% (or 4.9% 
of all debtors, N = 39) went on to file a subsequent case by 2002.69 Three percent (3%) 
of the debtors who obtained a discharge (8 of 262) (or 1%, 8 of 793) filed two or more 
times after having successfully completed a plan.  These data confirm anecdotal 
comments by Chapter 13 trustees that there is a small but identifiable group of debtors 
who seem to need a Chapter 13 trustee to manage their payments to creditors.
6. The “True” Rate of Chapter 13 Filings
It is commonly understood that the number of households seeking bankruptcy 
relief in a given period is the same as the number of petitions filed in that period.  The 
data reported in this Part IV show that there is in fact a large disparity between these two 
figures, and that the number of households seeking bankruptcy relief in a given year is 
substantially fewer than the number of petitions filed in that year.  As discussed, 50% of 
the debtors in the Chapter 13 Project had at least one other filing, and at least 
approximately 70% of the other filings were made within a year of the disposition of the 
immediately preceding case.  If the Project sample is representative of all Chapter 13 
debtors, the number of petitions overstates the number of households seeking Chapter 13 
relief by at least 35%.  In 1994, then, while debtors filed 240,639 petitions under Chapter 
13, they probably represented no more than 156,415 different households.  Likewise, if 
the refiling rates and intervals have remained relatively constant over the past ten years, 
the 467,000 Chapter 13 petitions filed in 2003 represented substantially fewer households 
– about 303,500.
Concomitantly, the actual ratio of Chapter 13 filers to total consumer bankruptcy 
petitioners also is much lower than commonly reported.  Again subject to the large 
caveats regarding representativeness of the Project sample and the stability of repeat 
filing rates over the following ten years, Chapter 13 filers comprise only about 20%, not 
30%, of all consumer filers in a given year.  Of course, as reported above, repeat filing 
rates vary significantly among districts, so that the “effective Chapter 13 filing rate” will 
vary by district.
V. DEBTOR FRESH START IN CHAPTER 13
A. Measuring Debtor Success in Chapter 13
Together with repayment of creditor claims, debtor fresh start is a primary policy 
objective underlying Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.  This Part first considers the 
extent to which the sample debtors achieved a fresh start or financial rehabilitation in 
Chapter 13.  It then examines the relationship between case outcome and an array of 
debtor characteristics and Chapter 13 plan features. Part VI then considers creditor
69
  The 4.9% rate of refiling after discharge very nearly matches the finding by Sullivan, Warren and 
Westbrook in their 1981 study that as many as 4% of Chapter 13 debtors filed again after receiving a 
discharge.  AWFOD, supra note 58, at 194.  
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collections in Chapter 13 cases.  Creditors naturally collect significantly more debt in 
cases where the debtor completes her plan (and receives a discharge) than in cases that 
are dismissed or converted either before or after confirmation of a plan.
The best, and perhaps only reliable, measure of debtor fresh start in Chapter 13 is 
the rate of debtor plan completion and discharge.  However, debtor discharge is not 
necessarily tantamount to an entirely fresh start.  Not all claims are dischargeable upon 
completion of a plan,70 and as noted above, about 15% of all debtors who attain a 
discharge file again for bankruptcy protection.  Conversely, some Chapter 13 trustees are 
quick to point out that some debtors achieve a fresh start without completing performance 
of a plan.  Some Chapter 13 debtors are able to regain their financial footing simply as a 
result of the breathing spell afforded by the automatic stay.  This breathing spell –
perhaps no longer than a few months or a year between filing and dismissal of a case – is 
enough to allow the debtor to cure defaults or pay off debts without further court 
supervision or debt relief. However, it is not possible to determine from court and trustee 
records whether a debtor “succeeded” in Chapter 13 short of obtaining a discharge.71
Thus, we are confined to measuring debtor fresh start in Chapter 13 based on discharge 
and refiling rates.
B. Debtor and District Discharge Rates in Chapter 13 – All Cases
The overall discharge rate for the debtors in the seven districts covered by the
Project was exactly the oft-repeated statistic of one-third.72 Sixty-seven percent (67%) of 
70
  See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (defining scope of the Chapter 13 discharge).
71
  See generally, Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, What is “Success” in Chapter 13?  Why 
Should we Care?, ABI J. (Sept. 2004), pp. 20, 65, 67 (considering various measures of success in Chapter 
13).
72
  The debtor discharge rates found in other studies have ranged from 20.35% to 36%.  See Jean Braucher, 
An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 
A.B.I. L. Rev. 557, 557 & n. 5 (2001) (majority of Chapter debtors in empirical study of filings in five 
judicial districts did not achieve discharge); Personal Bankruptcy: A Literature Review, CBO Paper, 
Congressional Budget Office (Sept. 2000), pp. 30-31 (reporting that an average of 36% of consumers filing 
Chapter 13 successfully completed their plans, but that this rate is probably understated because some of 
the dismissed cases may represent multiple filings by the same debtor or “face filings” that may have been 
dismissed before their plans were confirmed); Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, 
Measuring Projected Performance in Chapter 13: Comparisons Across the States, ABI J. (July/Aug. 2000), 
p. 22 (“[c]ompletion rates hover nationally at about one-third of confirmed plans, but this national average 
is a composite made up of extremely variable figures arising from different courtrooms, divisions and 
districts,” citing http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/statistics/stats-new/05/statistics5.htm); Scott F. Norberg, 
Consumer Bankruptcy’s New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 
13, 7 A.B.I. L. Rev. 415, 440 (1999); Michael Bork & Susan D. Tuck, Bankruptcy Statistical Trends, 
Chapter 13 Dispositions (Working Paper 2), Administrative Office of the Courts (reporting survey of 
chapter 13 cases filed between 1980 and 1988); T. Sullivan et al., As We Forgive Our Debtors 215-17 
(reporting on study of chapter 7 and 13 cases filed in 1981 in ten judicial districts in Pennsylvania, Texas 
and Illinois); Jim Wannamaker, The Washington Beat, 6 National Ass’n of Chap. Thirteen Trustees 
Newsletter, No. 1 at 7 (Oct. 1993); Michael Catrett, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, A Month of Debtors, 
“Foreclosure Tuesday” and the Rush to Chapter 13 in the Houston Division of the Southern District of 
Texas, ABI J. (May 2005), p. 24 (finding discharge rate of 23% for Chapter 13 cases filed in the Houston 
Division of  the Southern District of Texas in 1999).  See also William C. Whitford, The Ideal of 
Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in 
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the cases were dismissed or converted, either before or after confirmation.  As reported in 
Table 18, over 57% of the sample cases were dismissed, and nearly 10% were converted 
to Chapter 7.  Of the dismissed cases, one-third was dismissed before confirmation of a 
plan and two-thirds after confirmation; that is, about 19% of all filings were dismissed 
before confirmation, and 38% after confirmation of a plan.  The courts confirmed a plan 
in nearly 78% of all cases.
Table 18.  Discharge, Dismissal and Conversion Rates – All Cases
(N = 794 cases)
Dismissal Conversion Discharge









154 cases (19.4 %) 301 cases (37.9 %) 27 cases (3.4 %) 50 cases (6.3 %)
Table 19 below reports the discharge, dismissal and conversion rates by district, 
in order from left to right of lowest to highest rate of debtor discharge.  As a percentage 
of all filings, the discharge rates in the seven districts ranged from a low of 20% of 
Chapter 13 filings in the Western District of Tennessee to a high of 47% in the Middle 
District of North Carolina.  The average discharge rate among districts was 33.8%, 
almost identical to the overall rate of 33% for all debtors in the sample.  Excluding 
converted cases,73 statistical analysis reveals significant differences in disposition rates 
between districts.74
Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 Am. Bankr. L. J. 397, 410 (1994) (reporting results of unpublished survey 
conducted by the National Association of chapter 13 trustees that cumulated data from chapter 13 trustees 
by U.S. Trustee region; the unweighted average of the trustees’ reports of the percentage of chapter 13 
cases that were closed in 1993 as completed ranged from 3% to 49% across 22 regions, with average 
reported rate of 31%); cf. Marjorie L. Girth, The Role of Empirical Data in Developing Bankruptcy 
Legislation for Individuals, 65 Ind. L. Rev. 17, 42 (1989) (reporting study of chapter 13 cases filed in 
Buffalo Division of Western District of New York between 1979 and 1982, finding discharge rate over 
60% in cases in which a plan was confirmed).  
73 N = 77.
74 2(4, N = 717) = 49.71, p < .001.  
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Table 19.  Discharge, Dismissal and Conversion Rates – All Cases, by District



























































































sub-total of cases 130 100 165 100 99 100 100 794
Missing cases 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Total cases 130 100 165 100 100 100 100 795
C. Debtor and District Discharge Rates – Cases with a Confirmed Plan
Although Chapter 13 discharge rates normally are reported as a percentage of all 
Chapter 13 filings, it may be more instructive to report discharge rates based only on 
cases in which the court confirmed a plan, excluding cases in which the debtor did not 
obtain confirmation.  (As reported in Table 18 above, nearly 23% of the sample cases 
were dismissed or converted before confirmation of a plan.)  Cases dismissed or 
converted before confirmation normally are dismissed or converted within several 
months after filing.75  Some or many of these cases were filed by debtors who did not 
propose a plan with any serious intent to confirm it, or did not file a plan at all.  Neither 
the court nor the trustee has any immediate control over these filings (although their 
practices in regard to repeat filings may have an ex ante impact on such filings).  
Tables 20 and 21 show the overall, and district by district, discharge, dismissal
and conversion rates, excluding the cases that were dismissed or converted before 
confirmation. In Table 21 , the districts again are ordered from left to right from lowest to 
highest rate of debtor discharge. The discharge rates naturally are considerably higher 
when computed without cases dismissed or converted before confirmation.  Discharge 
rates ranged from a low of 26.5% in the Western District of Tennessee to a high of 54.4% 
in the Western District of Pennsylvania, with an overall rate of 42.7% for all debtors in 
the sample.  The average district rate was 43.5%.  The order of districts in Table 21 is 
almost the same as to the order of districts in Table 19, which includes cases dismissed 
before confirmation; the Western District of Pennsylvania supplants the Middle District 
of North Carolina by one percentage point as having had the highest rate of discharge 
among the seven districts.  
75
  See infra notes 149-152 and accompanying text (discussing time spent by debtors in chapter 13 cases) 
and Table 39.
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Table 20.  Discharge, Dismissal and Conversion Rates, Excluding Cases Dismissed 
or Converted Before Confirmation (N = 794 cases)
Dismissal and Conversion After Confirmation
351 cases (57.3%)
Discharge
262 cases (42.7 %)
Dismissal After Confirmation Conversion After Confirmation
301 cases (49.1%) 50 cases (8.2%)
Table 21.  Discharge, Dismissal and Conversion Rates, Excluding Cases Dismissed
or Converted Before Confirmation – by District























































sub-total 98 86 118 81 74 88 68 613
Missing 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Total 98 86 118 81 75 88 68 614
D. Relationship Between Pre-Confirmation Dismissal and Discharge Rates
We expected but did not find an inverse relation between the rate of pre-
confirmation dismissals and the rate of debtor discharge.  The cases that the debtor or the 
court dismisses without confirmation of a plan are the cases that are least likely to 
succeed, so that more dismissals would correlate with higher discharge rates as a 
percentage of cases with a confirmed plan.  Yet, as shown in Table 22 below, the district 
with the highest rate of discharge – the Middle District of North Carolina – had the 
lowest rate of pre-confirmation dismissals and conversions, while the district with the 
second highest rate of discharge – the Western District of Pennsylvania – had the highest 
rate of pre-confirmation dismissals and conversions.  Conversely, the district with the 
lowest rate of discharge – the Western District of Tennessee – had among the higher rates 
of pre-confirmation dismissals and conversions, while the district with the second lowest 
rate of discharge – the Middle District of Tennessee – also had the second lowest rate of 
pre-confirmation dismissals and conversions.
The absence of any correlation between the rate of pre-confirmation dismissals 
and conversions and the rate of debtor discharge suggests that some courts generally do 
not carefully screen cases for feasibility. In fact, courts and trustees may see little 
downside in allowing debtors to proceed with even the most unrealistic plans.  Absent 
any creditor objection based on the treatment of its claim, the alternative is dismissal or 
conversion to Chapter 7, where unsecured creditors are not likely to collect anything.  As 
the chief judge in one of the sample districts remarked, the test for feasibility is a
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“heartbeat” test; if the debtor has a heartbeat, the plan is feasible.76 One exception may 
be the Western District of Pennsylvania, which had fewer than expected dismissals after 
confirmation and more than expected dismissals before confirmation.77
Table 22.  Comparison of Discharge, and Dismissal/Conversion Before 
Confirmation Rates, by District 





% of all cases)
24.6% 14.0% 28.5% 19.0% 25.2% 32.0% 12.0% 22.8%
Discharges (as % 
of all cases)
20.0% 29.0% 30.9% 36.0% 36.4% 37.0% 47.0% 33.0%
Discharges (as % 
of cases with 
confirmed plan)
26.5% 33.7% 43.2% 44.4% 48.6% 54.4% 53.4% 42.7%
VI. PREDICTING OUTCOME IN CHAPTER 13 CASES
The modest rates of debtor discharge in Chapter 13 found in this and other 
studies, together with the data in Part VII below demonstrating a close, positive 
association between debtor discharge and creditor collections, invites an examination of 
factors that may be related to case outcome.  This Part now considers a number of 
variables that can be gleaned from court and trustee records that may bear on case 
outcome: (a) certain debtor characteristics, including gender, joint filing status, income, 
amount and type of debt, and debt-income ratio; (b) other bankruptcy filings; and (c) 
Chapter 13 plan features, including household budget, proposed plan payments, amount 
of income reserved for living expenses, proposed distribution to unsecured creditors, and 
proposed plan length.
A. Debtor Characteristics and Case Outcome
1. Gender, Joint Filing Status and Case Outcome
Among cases in which the gender of the individual petitioner could be reasonably 
surmised (N = 567), there was no significant relation between discharge, dismissal, or 
conversion rates and the gender of the petitioner.78  As reported in Table 23 below, 
almost 30% of men filing individually obtained a discharge, compared to 26% of the 
women; 36.4% of filings by individual men were dismissed after confirmation, compared 
76
  See also Lynn M. LoPucki, Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 Am. Bankr. L. J. 461, 474-475 
(1997) (commenting that many judges . . . . ).  But see Gary Neustadter, When Lawyer and Client Meet” 
Observations of Interviewing and Counseling Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law Office, 35 Buff. 
L. Rev. 177, 204) (1986) (stating the local bankruptcy judge carefully assessed feasibility of proposed 
Chapter 13 plans).
77
  The combination of lower discharge rate and higher pre-confirmation dismissal rate reported in Table 21 
for the Western District of Tennessee may have been a function of the very high numbers of serial filers 
there.  See supra note 63 and accompanying text and Figure 4.
78 2 (4, N = 567) = 4.49, p = .344.
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to 44.5% of filing by women; and 25.2% of filings by individual men were dismissed 
before confirmation, compared to 20.4% of filings by women. 


















Men 84 (29.4%) 104 (36.4%) 72 (25.2%) 18 (6.3%) 8 (2.8%) 286
Women 73 (26%) 125 (44.5%) 57 (20.3%) 19 (6.8%) 7 (2.5%) 281
Total 157 (27.2%) 229 (40.4%) 129 (22.8%) 37 (6.5%) 15 (2.6%) 567
On the other hand, as reported in Table 24 below, joint petitioners were 
significantly more likely to achieve a discharge than debtors who filed individually.  The 
discharge rate (47.3%) in jointly filed cases was substantially higher than the discharge 
rate for individual petitioners (28.0%).  Correspondingly, the dismissal rate in jointly 
filed cases was substantially lower (41.5%) than the dismissal rate in cases filed by 
individual petitioners (62.5%).79  There were no differences in conversion rates between 
joint and individual petitioners. 
The significant, positive correlation between joint filing status and discharge does 
not appear to be related to the presence of a second income, however.  The discharge rate 
for the 102 (of 585) individual filers who reported spousal income was not significantly 
different than that for individual filers not reporting spousal income.80







































Total 262 300 154 54 23 793 (2 missing)
79 2 (4, N = 793) = 32.61, p  .001.
80 2 (4, N = 586) = 5.04, p = .283.  Moreover, both spouses did not necessarily have income in the jointly 
filed cases.  Data on spousal income are missing in 56, or 28%, of the 202 jointly filed cases. 
Relatedly, in cases where spousal income was more than $0, there was no difference in amount of 
spousal gross income between jointly filed cases (M = $1261.75, SEM = 78.5) and individually filed cases 
with spousal income (M = $1253, SEM = 69.1), t(246) = .079, p = .937.  There also was no difference in 
spousal net income between jointly filed cases (M = $1007.56, SEM = 55.6) and individually filed cases 
with spousal income (M = $996.57, SEM = 53.1), t(246) = .140, p = .889.
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2. Debtor and Household Income
Table 5 in Part IV.B above reports on debtor and debtor household, annual gross 
and net income.  Here, we investigate the association, if any, between income and case 
outcome.  Table 25 below details annual gross and net incomes for debtors and their
households in cases in which the debtor obtained a discharge, and in cases that were 
dismissed or converted.81 Debtors who achieved a discharge had significantly higher 
household (but not individual82) net incomes than debtors whose cases were dismissed.83
The median net income of the debtor households in the cases in which the debtor 
achieved a discharge was $20,520, compared to $17,376 for the debtor households in 
dismissed cases.
Debtors who completed their plans also had significantly higher gross incomes84
and their households had significantly higher gross incomes85 than the debtors in cases 
that were dismissed.86 The median gross income of the individual debtors in the cases in 
which the debtor achieved a discharge was $20,796, compared to $17,298 for the 
individual debtors in dismissed cases.  The median gross income of the debtor households 
in the cases in which the debtor achieved a discharge was $25,392, compared to $20,400 
for the debtor households in dismissed cases.
81
  “Gross income” refers to all income of the debtor or household.  “Net income” refers to income minus 
payroll deductions.  “Household income” refers to the combined incomes of the debtor and any spouse.  
See Schedules, Schedule I, Form 6, Official Bankruptcy Forms.  Schedule I, Current Income of Individual 
Debtor(s), requires the debtor itemize the debtor’s monthly gross income and payroll deductions; and the 
debtor’s spouse’s monthly gross income and payroll deductions, if the debtor is married, regardless of 
whether the petition was a joint petition with the spouse.  Schedule J, Current Expenditures of Individual 
Debtor(s), requires the debtor to provide a monthly budget for the household.  Thus, debtor net income 
(before plan payments) and household net income can be readily computed by subtracting total monthly 
expenses in Schedule J from monthly income in Schedule I.  
82
  While the ANOVA on debtor net income approached significance, F(2,687) = 2.53, p = .08, eta-sq = 
.007, the assumption of a significant F to justify the use of post hoc  Scheffe’ tests is not met.  Regardless, 
the post hoc analyses did not indicate any trend toward significance in these between-group differences, all 
p’s >= .117.
83
 Scheffe’ tests at an alpha level of .05
84 F (2,684) = 4.75, p = .009, 2 = .014
85 F (2,680) = 9.87, p  .001, 2 = .028
86
 Scheffe’ tests at an alpha level of .05
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Table 25.  Debtor Income and Discharge in Chapter 13 











































missing) $0 - $480,00090 $21,782 $27,374 $1,314 $8,460 $17,376 $25,524
3.       Creditor Claims and Case Outcome
        The Chapter 13 Project also investigated any relation between case outcome and 
amount and type of pre-bankruptcy debt.  Table 26 below reports the amounts of secured, 
priority, general unsecured and total debt in (1) cases in which the debtor obtained a 
discharge, (2) cases dismissed or converted after confirmation of a plan, and (3) cases 
dismissed or converted before confirmation. We found a significant relation between case 
outcome and a debtor’s (a) allowed unsecured debts,91 and (b) total combined allowed 
secured, priority and general unsecured debts.92  Debtors with greater unsecured debt and 
greater total combined debts tended to complete their plans and obtain a discharge at 
higher rates than debtors with lesser unsecured and total combined debts whose cases
were dismissed after confirmation.  However, the debtors who completed their plans did 
not have significantly greater secured93 or priority debt than debtors who did not obtain a 
discharge.  
As further reported in Table 26, the median amounts of total debt for debtors who 
completed their plans was $19,375, compared to $14,373 for debtors whose cases were 
dismissed after confirmation, and $9,386 for debtors whose cases were dismissed before 
confirmation.  Perhaps debtors who completed their plans were more likely to have 
delayed filing bankruptcy, while continuing to take on debt, and thus the correlation 
87 All amounts > $ 70,164 (M + 3 SD) were excluded from subsequent descriptive and inferential 
procedures.
88
  All amounts > $ 98,412 (M + 3 SD) were excluded from subsequent descriptive and inferential 
procedures.
89
  All amounts > $ 80,700 (M + 3 SD) were excluded from subsequent descriptive and inferential 
procedures.
90
  All amounts > $ 103,896 (M + 3 SD) were excluded from subsequent descriptive and inferential 
procedures.
91
  Mann-Whitney U = 29488, z = -4.796, p # .001.
92
  Mann-Whitney U = 33134, z = -2.303, p = .021. 
93
  As discussed above, we excluded long-term mortgage debts from this analysis.  As a result, secured debt 
is substantially understated here.  See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
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between amount of debt and case outcome indicates that debtors who delay filing are 
more likely to complete their plans.  Arguably, debtors who struggled longer with paying 
their debts before filing bankruptcy were more likely to make the effort necessary to 
complete their plans after filing. 




































































































































































$69,817 $21,959 $18,779 4,003 $371 $8,252 $18,204 $31,274 $56,461
Finally, we found no significant relation between home ownership – mortgage 
debt – and case outcome.  The absence of significance exists not only as between cases 
dismissed or converted before confirmation, cases dismissed or converted after 
confirmation and completed cases,95 but also as between all dismissed or converted cases 
and completed cases.96
94
  Due to the non-normality of these distributions, assumption-freer analyses are used (Kruskal-Wallis and median test).
95
  Chi-sq (4, N=794) = .664, p = .956.
96
  Chi-sq (1, N=794) = .004, p = .951.
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4. Debtor and Household Debt-Income Ratios97
Debtors who confirmed a plan (and who either obtained a discharge98 or had their 
cases dismissed after confirmation99) had significantly higher personal debt-income ratios 
than debtors whose cases were dismissed before confirmation.100  Likewise, debtors who 
confirmed a plan (and either obtained a discharge101 or had their cases dismissed after 
confirmation102) had significantly higher household debt-income ratios than debtors 
whose cases were dismissed before confirmation.103 The difference between the median 
debtor debt-income ratio in completed cases and dismissed or converted cases was 
modest but significant.  As shown in Table 27 below, the median debtor debt-income 
ratio in completed cases was 0.979, while in dismissed cases it was 0.907; and the median 
household debt-income ratio was 0.918 in completed cases, compared to 0.807 in 
dismissed cases.  Post hoc statistical analyses did not indicate any significant differences 
in the debt-income ratios of debtors who completed their plans and of debtors whose 
cases were dismissed after confirmation.104 In sum, the debtors in greatest need of debt 
relief were more likely to attain confirmation of a plan, while debtors with less need were 
less likely to do so.  These data further support the inference that debtors who are most 
reluctant to file, and so have higher debt-income ratios by the time they file, are more 
likely to have the determination to complete a plan.  As discussed above, most cases 
dismissed before confirmation are dismissed at the debtor’s instance or because the 
debtor did not file a plan.  Further, as discussed below,105 debtors whose cases were 
dismissed before confirmation were more likely to file again.  Together with these facts, 
the lower debt-income ratios of debtors whose cases were dismissed before confirmation 
suggests that some of these debtors may have used the system for reasons other than 
obtaining relief from their debts, perhaps simply to obtain temporary protection of the 
automatic stay.
97
  Debt was computed by totaling allowed claims in the case, excluding long-term mortgages that would 
remain to be paid after completion of the plan.  (It may not always have been possible to identify long-term 
mortgage debts from the name of the creditor, so some may be included in the calculations.)  Annual net 
income was computed by multiplying by 12 the net monthly incomes listed in the debtors’ Schedules. 
98
  Scheffe’ test, M = 1.35 (SEM = .073).
99
  Scheffe’ test, M = 1.31 (SEM = .066).
100
  Scheffe’ test, M = 1.04 (SEM = .097). 
101
  Scheffe’ test, M = 1.11 (SEM = .059).
102
  Scheffe’ test, M = 1.12 (SEM = .053).
103
  Scheffe’ test, M = 0.857 (SEM = .080).
104
 Scheffe’ tests at an alpha level of .05.  Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook found that the non-mortgage 
debt-income ratios of Chapter 7 debtors were statistically indistinguishable from those of Chapter 13 
debtors.  AWFOD, supra note 55, at 238-39 & tables 13.2, 13.3; Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & 
Jay L. Westbrook, Laws, Models, and Real People: Choice of Chapter in Personal Bankruptcy, 13 Law and 
Soc. Inq. 661 (1988).  Thus, ability to repay does not distinguish debtors who choose to file under Chapter 
13 from those who file under Chapter 7.  The Chapter 13 Project findings here that debt-income ratios of 
Chapter 13 debtors who completed their plans were significantly higher than debtors who did not attain a 
discharge suggests an inverse relation between ability to repay and discharge in Chapter 13.
105
  Infra notes 110-111 and accompanying text and Table 29.
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Table 27.  Debtor and Household Debt-Annual Net Income Ratios and Case 
Outcome




































25.17109 1.04 0.972 0.047 0.438 0.807 1.29
B. Other Bankruptcy Filings and Case Outcome
In this section, we discuss the relation between other bankruptcy filings and case 
outcome.  As discussed in Part IV.C. above, among the most remarkable findings of the 
Project is the very high numbers of repeat filers.  At least one-half of the sample debtors 
had filed at least one other case: the available data show that 30% had filed one other 
case, 10% had filed two other cases; and 10% had filed three or more cases in addition to 
the sample case.110
Debtors who filed bankruptcy for the first time in the sample case were 
significantly more likely to complete their plans than debtors who had filed one or more 
previous cases.  Conversely, sample debtors whose cases were dismissed were more 
likely to have filed previously.111  As shown in Table 28 below, of the debtors who had 
not filed a previous case, 38% successfully completed their plans, compared to a 
completion rate of 22.5% for debtors who had filed one previous case.  The completion 
106
  All ratios > 6.8 (M + 3 SD) were excluded from subsequent descriptive and inferential procedures.
107
  All ratios > 5.1 (M + 3 SD) were excluded from subsequent descriptive and inferential procedures.
108
  All ratios > 6.98 (M + 3 SD) were excluded from subsequent descriptive and inferential procedures.
109
  All ratios > 6.15 (M + 3 SD) were excluded from subsequent descriptive and inferential procedures.
110
  See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text and Figure 3 and Table 11.
111 Previous Filings and Plan Completion/Chi-square Analysis
Record of Previous Filing and Current Case Outcome
Outcome of Current Case Total
Discharge No discharge
No 213 347 560
Any Previous Filings?
Yes 49 186 235
Total 262 533 795
2 (1, N = 795) = 22.12, p <.001
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rate plummeted to 14% for debtors who had filed two or more cases before the sample 
case.112
Table 28.  Previous Filings and Case Outcome, by Number of Previous Filings
# of Previous Filings # of Debtors




% of All 
Debtors
0 560 70.4% 213 38.0%
1 178 22.4% 40 22.5%
2 - 5 57 7.2% 8 14.0%
All cases 795 100.0% 262 33.0%
A chi-square analysis confirms the significant relation between outcome in the 
sample case and whether the debtor had any previous filings.113  As reflected in Table 29, 
only 19% of debtors who obtained a discharge in the sample case had a record of any 
previous filings.  In other words, the sample case was the first case114 filed for 81% of the 
debtors who obtained a discharge in the sample case.  By contrast, 30% of sample debtors 
whose current case was dismissed or converted after confirmation, and 44% of debtors 
whose current case was dismissed or converted before confirmation, had a record of at 
least one previous filing.
Table 29.  Previous Filings and Case Outcome, by Case Outcome
Any Previous Filings? Total
Close Code for the 
Current Case No Yes
discharged 213 (81%) 49 (19%) 262
dismissed or 
converted after 
confirmation 248 (70%) 107 (30%) 355
dismissed or 
converted before 
confirmation 99 (56%) 78 (44%) 177
Total 560 234 794
112
  Consistent with these findings, Professor Lown found a discharge rate of only 2.9% for Chapter 13 
debtors filing for relief in Utah in 1997 when they had filed three other cases within two years or four or 
more cases within 20 years (defining such debtors as “serial filers” and “possible abusers”).  She further 
found that males and females filing individually were nearly 50% less likely to be abusers than joint filers; 
that serial filers had higher secured debt but lower unsecured debt than other repeat filers; and that serial 
filers reported higher monthly income than the other debtors.   Jean M. Lown, Serial Bankruptcy: A 20-
Year Study of Utah Filers, Am. Bankr. Inst. J. (Feb. 2006), at 24-25, 68-69.  Cf. Norberg, supra note 49, at 
450 (study of 71 chapter 13 cases filed in the Southern District of Mississippi between 1992 and 1998; 
finding that debtors who had filed single prior case obtained a discharge at a greater rate than first-time 
filers). 
113 2 (4, N = 794) = 45.99,  p  .01
114
 This statement must be qualified by the likelihood that some of the sample debtors had filed a case 
earlier than recorded in the PACER system, or in another jurisdiction.
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Finally, the data regarding filings after discharge in the sample case confirm the 
relation between multiple filings and case outcome.  Chi-square analysis again reveals a 
significant relation between outcome in the sample case and whether the debtor had any 
subsequent filings.115  As shown in Table 30 below, 15% of debtors who obtained a 
discharge in the sample case had a record of any subsequent filings.  In other words, 85% 
of the debtors who obtained a discharge in the sample case did not return to 
bankruptcy.116  In contrast, 41% of sample debtors whose current case was dismissed 
after confirmation, and 49% of debtors whose current case was dismissed before 
confirmation, filed at least one more case.
Table 30.  Case Outcome and Subsequent Filings, by Case Outcome
Any Subsequent Filings? Total
Close Code for the 
Current Case No Yes
discharged 223 (85%) 39 (15%) 262
dismissed after 
confirmation 177 (59%) 123 (41%) 300
dismissed before 
confirmation 78 (51%) 76 (49%) 154
converted after 
confirmation 41 (75%) 13 (25%) 54
converted before 
confirmation 12 (55%) 10 (45%) 22
531 261 792
In sum, the statistical analyses reported in this section indicate that with each 
successive filing, the debtor is less likely to complete a plan, and more likely to have 
sought relief without the intent or ability to consummate a plan.
C. Chapter 13 Plan Provisions and Case Outcome
1. Plan Payments, and Debtor and Household Retained Income
Table 31 below reports on: (1) the debtors’ monthly plan payments – the dollar 
amounts that the debtors proposed to devote to payment of creditor claims under their
plans (excluding any payments to be made to creditors outside the plan); and (2) the 
debtors’ “retained income” – the monthly income that the debtors, and their households,
would retain after making their plan payments, to cover (a) current living expenses and 
(b) any payments to creditors outside the plan.117
115 2 (4, N = 792) = 69.73,  p  .01
116
 Again, this statement must be qualified by the likelihood that some of these current debtors had filed a 
case after completion of the search of records in the PACER system, or in another jurisdiction.
117
  In addition to reporting gross and net debtor and household income, see Schedule I, Chapter 13 debtors 
must submit a budget of current expenses, which includes all expenses, from rent or mortgage to utilities 
and insurance; and excludes plan payments, see Schedule J.  See supra n. 81.  “Retained income” was 
calculated by subtracting the proposed plan payments from net income as reported in Schedule I.
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Debtors’ proposed monthly payments to creditors under their plans ranged from 
minimal -- $24 per month – to very large -- $3,060 per month --, with a mean and median 
of $400 and $310, respectively.
The mean and median amounts of income retained by individual debtors for 
payment of current expenses and any payments outside the plan were very modest, $988 
and $875, respectively.  For debtor households, the mean and median amounts were only 
$1315 and $1134.  Even at the 75th percentile, the income retained for current living 
expenses was limited -- $1295 for individual debtors and $1709 for debtor households.
The data indicate that a number of debtors proposed plans that were patently not
feasible, that is, current living expenses and proposed payments to creditors exceeded 
household net income.  There were 294 cases in which debtor or household net income 
minus current expenses and proposed payments to creditors was less than $0.  Indeed, in 
61 of these cases, net income minus current expenses was less than $0, meaning that,
according to the debtor’s proposed budget, there was no income available to make 
payments to creditors.  In a few cases (N=8), the debtors proposed to make payments to
creditors that exceeded their net incomes.  In other words, these debtors did not budget
any income to cover current expenses after making their plan payments.  Debtor retained 
income ranged as low as -$1,818, and household retained income as low as -$508.
Table 31.  Proposed Plan Payments and Retained Income


















missing) <-$508> - $39600120 $1,315 $808 30.1 $759 $1,134 $1,709 
As to be expected, there was no significant difference in case outcome based on 
the amounts that the debtors dedicated to repayment of creditor claims; standing alone, 
and without regard to net income, current expenses or retained income, the amount that 
debtors proposed to pay to pre-bankruptcy creditors was not significantly related to 
whether the debtor obtained a discharge.121
118 All payment amounts > $1596 (M +3 SD) were excluded from subsequent descriptives and inferential 
procedures.
119 All income amounts > $6346 (M +3 SD) were excluded from subsequent descriptives and inferential 
procedures.
120 All income amounts > $6822 (M +3 SD) were excluded from subsequent descriptives and inferential 
procedures.
121
  Completed cases (n = 246), M = $382 (SEM = 18.9) versus dismissed cases (n = 471), M = $408 (SEM
= 13.5); t(714) = 1.13, p = .258 (ns). 
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Unexpectedly, the data also indicate no significant relationship between debtor 
retained income and case outcome.  Individual debtors who retained more income to pay 
current living expenses122 were not more likely to complete their plans.123 Indeed, 30% 
(91 of 294) of the debtors whose budgets indicated less income than living expenses plus
payments to creditors actually completed their plans.124  This is only slightly lower than 
the overall discharge rate of 33%.  Only 15% (45 of 294) of these cases were dismissed 
or converted before confirmation; in 85% of the cases, the court confirmed the debtor’s 
facially infeasible plan.  As with the amount of proposed plan payments, then, the amount 
of debtor retained income, standing alone and without regard to the debtor’s standard of 
living, did not bear significantly on a debtor’s completion of a plan.
The data regarding debtors’ infeasible budgets support a number of inferences.  
They confirm that some courts and Chapter 13 trustees do not always carefully screen 
plans for confirmation based on feasibility, at least where there is no creditor objection to 
confirmation.  And given the plan completion rate for debtors whose plans were 
apparently not feasible, the lack of screening for feasibility appears warranted.  The data 
also may mean that many debtors (and not just those whose plans are not feasible) 
understate income and overstate expenses.  Alternatively, the data are reason to conclude
that some debtors are in bankruptcy because they lack basic money management skills,
such as constructing a budget, although the debtor’s attorney might be expected to 
address the problem.  Alternatively, or in addition, perhaps the data are not reliable as we 
have used them here; combining numbers from different sources –Schedules I and J, on 
the one hand, and the debtor’s plan, on the other – may have produced inaccuracies.
Finally, while individual debtor retained income was not significantly related to 
case outcome, as reported in Table 32 below, household retained income was
significantly related to case outcome.125 These findings parallel the findings above 
regarding the relation between case outcome and debtor and household annual income.126
122
  By the same token, the debtor may not reserve more than a reasonable amount of income for payment 
of living expenses unless the plan will pay unsecured creditors in full, 11 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) (stating that 
all of a debtor’s disposable income must be used to make payments under plan.  
123
  Completed cases (n = 252), M = $1022 (SEM = 45.8) versus dismissed cases (n = 473), M = $969 (SEM
= 31.9); t(723) = 0.96, p = .339 (ns).
124
  Even more surprising, two of the eight debtors whose budgets showed net income that was less than 
their plan payments alone completed their plan and obtained a discharge.
125
  Completed cases (n = 249), M = $1407 (SEM = 47.6) versus dismissed cases (n = 473), M = $1266 
(SEM = 38.3); t(720) = 2.30, p =.026.
126
  See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text and Table 25.
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Table 32.  Household Retained Income in Completed and Dismissed Cases
N Range Mean SD SEM 25% Median 75%
Discharged 249 -<$508> - $3869 $1,407 $751 47.6 $842 $1,314 $1,800 
Dismissed 
After 
Confirmation 282 -<250> - $5037 $1,149 $718.93 42.8 $687 $977 $1,505 
Dismissed 
Before 
Confirmation 120 -<157> - $4377 $1,452 $919.34 83.9 $767 $1,243 $2,001 
Converted 
After 
Confirmation 53 $150 - $ 5804 $1,497 $1,090 149.7 $747 $1,184 $1,936 
Converted 
Before 
Confirmation 18 $50 - $2956 $1,189 $733.72 172.9 $664 $994 $1,602 
ALL CASES
726 (69 
missing) -<$508> - $39600127 $1,315 $808.03 30.1 $758 $1,134 $1,709 
2. Proposed Distributions to Unsecured Creditors
The Bankruptcy Code does not mandate a minimum amount or percentage 
distribution that a Chapter 13 plan must provide to unsecured creditors.  Generally, as 
long as the plan meets the best interests requirement128 and the debtor devotes all 
“disposable income” to the payment of unsecured claims,129 the percentage distribution is 
irrelevant.  In practice, however, there reportedly has been considerable variation among 
districts regarding the level of repayment that Chapter 13 debtors propose.  An earlier 
survey suggested that many debtors proposed plans that pay more than required by the 
best interests and disposable income tests because their attorneys advised them to do so in 
order to comply with judges’ and trustees’ expectations and thereby maintain economical, 
routinized practices.130
As reported in Table 33 below, the debtors in the sample cases proposed to pay 
from 0% to 100% of general unsecured claims.  There were a large number of “missing 
cases” – 230 – in which there was no proposed distribution to unsecured creditors, 
including at least 94 cases in which the debtors proposed to make an unspecified, pro rata 
distribution to be determined at confirmation based on filed, allowed claims.  As a result, 
the data reported here are not definitive.  Excluding the “missing cases,” the large 
majority of debtors proposed to pay either 100% or less than 26% of their unsecured 
debts. The modal proposed distribution was 100%; 206 (31.2%) of the debtors who 
127 All income amounts > $6822 (M +3 SD) were excluded from subsequent descriptives and inferential 
procedures.
128
  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
129
  11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
130
  See William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer 
Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 Am. Bankr. L. J. 397, 405-06 (1994); 
Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 Am. Bankr. L. J. 501, 
532 (1993).
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proposed to pay a specified distribution to unsecured creditors proposed to pay 100 cents 
on the dollar.  The large standard deviation – nearly 42% – reflects this wide variation in 
the proposed levels of repayment to general creditors.
Table 33.  Proposed Distributions to Unsecured Creditors
N Range Mean SD SEM 25% Median 75%
565 0% - 100% 48.76% 41.71% 1.75 10% 25% 100%
230 cases missing (including 94 cases in which plans provided for pro rata distribution to unsecured 
creditors); mode = 100% (206 cases / 36.5%)
As reported in Table 34 below, debtors in nearly 45% of the cases in which a 
distribution was reported proposed to pay no more than 25% of unsecured claims, while 
nearly 15% of the debtors, all in the District of Maryland and the Southern District of 
Georgia, proposed to pay an unspecified, pro rata distribution to general creditors.131
Relatively few debtors – less than 10% -- proposed to pay between 26% and 99%.  
Again, because of the large number of excluded cases, the figures reported here are 
necessarily tentative; the distributions in the excluded cases might have been anywhere 
between 0% and 100%.     
Table 34.  Proposed Levels of Repayment on Unsecured Claims
proposed % N % of cases
pro-rata 94 14.2%
0% - 9% 121 18.3%
10% - 15% 40 6.1%
16% - 25% 135 20.4%
26% - 50% 35 5.3%
51% - 99% 28 4.2%
100% 206 31.2%
TOTAL 659 100%
131 There were 136 “missing cases” in which a proposed distribution to unsecured creditors could not be 
ascertained.  However, in many of these cases, the proposed distribution was not in fact “missing;” rather, 
the debtor proposed a pro-rata distribution, with the distribution to be designated after the bar date for filing 
of claims.  The following table breaks out the number of missing and pro rata cases by district.    
District (number of cases) Number of pro rata distributions Number of cases missing a 
proposed distribution
MD (100) 41 22
MDNC (100) 0 8
MDTN (100) 0 7
NDGA (165) 0 22
SDGA (100) 53 4
WDPA (100) 0 22
WDTN (130) 0 51
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Analysis of the proposed distributions to unsecured creditors (excluding pro rata 
distribution cases) between the districts in the study indicates a significant relation 
between district and the percentage distribution proposed in debtors’ plans.132 Debtors in 
the Middle District of North Carolina proposed to pay a significantly lower percentage of
unsecured claims133 than debtors in the other districts.134
There was no statistically significant difference in the proposed percentage to be 
paid on unsecured debt by debtors in completed cases than by debtors in cases dismissed 
or converted either before or after confirmation. That is, the debtors who completed their 
plans and obtained a discharge did not propose to repay a significantly different 
percentage of general unsecured claims than debtors whose cases were dismissed or 
converted.135  These findings are counterintuitive, and appear to contradict data collected 
in another survey.136  Perhaps the absence of a significant relationship between the 
percentage of unsecured claims to be paid under a plan and plan completion is explained 
by the fact that the bankruptcy courts in the study, unlike some other courts, generally did 
not expect or impose a fixed or minimum percentage of general claims that must be paid.
As a result, most of the debtors in the sample cases were not faced with having to devote 
income to paying unsecured claims without regard to how much income was available 
after a reasonable forecast of a household budget.  Table 35 reports on the percentages of 
unsecured debt that debtors proposed to pay in completed, dismissed and converted cases.
132 F (6,558) = 3.91, p = .001, 02 = .040.  Professor Whitford likewise found large variations among 
districts as to proposed distributions to unsecured creditors in data he obtained from the National 
Association of Chapter 13 Trustees in 1993.  See Whitford, supra note 126, at 409-411 and Table 2 (in 
survey of Chapter 13 trustees, 71% of whom responded, the percentage of confirmed plans proposing to 
pay 100% of unsecured claims ranged from 6% to 52%; while the average proposed payout in less-than-
100% plans ranged from 13% to 56%).  Accord, Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One 
Code, Many Cultures, 67 Am. Bankr. L. J. 501, 532 (study of practices in  four districts, finding “floor” 
percentage of 100% in two, and 25-33% in one, and 70% in another).   
133 (M = 31.7%, SEM = 4.28).
134
 Also, debtors in the District of Maryland proposed to pay a significantly higher percentage on unsecured 
claims (M = 61.3%, SEM = 6.75), however, this observation is based on only 37 of 100 cases.
135
 Mann-Whitney U = 34135, z = -1.128, p = .259; Kruskal-Wallis X2(4, N=565)=6.872, p=.143).
136 See William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer 
Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy 68 Am. Bankr. L. J. 397, 410-12 (1994).  
See also Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 
Completion Not Shown, 9 A.B.I. L. J. 557, 577-579 (2001).
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Table 35.  Case Outcome and Proposed Distributions to Unsecured Creditors
Completed Cases
N Range Mean SD SEM 25% Median 75%
196 0% - 100% 44.31% 40.11% 2.85 10% 25% 100%
mode = 100% (60 cases/30.6%)
Dismissed Cases
N Range Mean SD SEM 25% Median 75%
369 0% - 100% 51.13% 42.50% 2.21 10% 30% 100%
mode = 100% (146 cases/39.6%)
Converted Cases
N Range Mean SD SEM 25% Median 75%
54 0% - 100% 45.14% 39.45% 5.39 14.5% 25% 100%
3. Proposed Plan Length
As shown in Table 36 below, the debtors proposed plans with lengths ranging 
between 0 and 60 months, with a mean and median length of 52.43 and 60 months, 
respectively.137 At both the median and 75th percentile, the proposed length of debtor 
plans was 60 months.  As further reported in Table 35, debtors in 60% of all cases in 
which a proposed plan length was reported proposed a 60-month plan, with nearly 70% 
proposing a plan of more than 48 months, and almost 80% proposing a plan of more than 
the statutory minimum of 36 months.
By law, a Chapter 13 plan may not exceed 36 months except for “cause.”138 The 
maximum plan length is 60 months,139 while the minimum is 36 months unless the debtor 
proposes to pay 100% of unsecured claims under a shorter plan.140  Thus, as reported in 
Tables 36 and 37, it is notable that so many of the debtors proposed plans longer than 36 
months, and that the median and modal lengths  of the sample debtors’ plans were 60 
months, or 24 months longer than the standard set out in the Bankruptcy Code.  Indeed, 
137
  The sample cases in which the debtor proposed a plan of less than 12 months would appear to be 
mistakes.  There are only eight of these cases, however, and they do not materially alter the analyses of 
these data.
138
  11 U.S.C. § 1322(d).
139
  11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1).
140
  11 U.S.C. § 1322(d).
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the length of plans at the 25th percentile was 47 months, or nearly a year longer than the 
standard envisioned by the Bankruptcy Code.141
Table 36.  Proposed Length of Debtor Plans
N Range Mean SD SEM 25% Median 75%











Plan length N %
0-12 months 8 1.4% 
13-24 months 6 1.0%
25-36 months 108 18.4%
37-48 months 55 9.4%
49-60 months 410 69.8%
60 months 352 60.0%
Missing142 208 -----
We hypothesized that debtors who proposed to make plan payments over a longer 
period of time would be more likely to complete their plans.  By stretching payments to 
creditors over a longer term, in particular payments to secured creditors enabling the 
debtor to keep collateral, a debtor would be better able to afford  them.143 The data do 
not, however, support this thesis.  To the contrary, as reported in Table 37, debtors who 
completed their plans proposed significantly shorter plans144 than debtors who did not.145
Perhaps shorter  plans reduce the risks of income and expense disruptions, or require 
correspondingly less discipline on the part of the debtor, and so are more likely to be 
completed.
141
  There were eight cases in which the debtor proposed a plan between 0 and 12 months.  The cases 
proposing a plan of no length, and others of very short duration, may be errors, but because there are so few 
of these cases, any such errors do not affect the overall analyses. 
142
  Most of the missing cases are from NDGA because indefinite plan lengths (e.g., 36-60 months) were 
specified.
143
  See Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 
Completion Not Shown, 9 A.B.I. L. J. 557, 574-75 (2001) (because the judges in all five districts covered 
by the study routinely confirmed five-year plans, it was not possible to determine the impact of the practice 
on plan completion).
144 M = 51.31 months, SD = 11.25, SEM = .789.
145 M = 53.45 months, SD = 11.07, SEM = .568), t(409.6*) = 2.196, p = .029.  (The degrees of freedom in 
this test are reduced due to the significant inequality of variance revealed by Levene's Test, F = 6.234, p = 
.013.)  However, disposition was not significantly related to plan length, F(2,515) = 2.39, p = .093, eta^2 = 
.009, when cases in which the debtor obtained a discharge were separately compared to cases that were 
dismissed after confirmation and to cases that were dismissed before confirmation.
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Table 37.  Proposed Length of Plan in Completed and Dismissed Cases
N Range Mean SD SEM 25% Median 75%
Case Dismissed 
Before 



















Discharge 203 10 - 60 51.4 11.23 0.788 36 60 60
58 cases 
missing
There was no significant difference in the plan length proposed by individual 
filers146 compared to the plan length proposed by joint filers.147  As discussed elsewhere, 
joint filers completed their plans at a statistically greater rate than individual filers.148
An analysis of the variance in proposed length of plans revealed statistically 
significant differences between the proposed length of the debtor plans in the Middle 
District of North Carolina and the other six districts.149 As reported in Table 38 below, 
these post-hoc statistical comparisons revealed significantly shorter plans in the MDNC 
than in the other districts; 38% of the plans filed in that district had proposed plan lengths 
of 36 months.  The post-hoc statistical comparisons also revealed significantly longer 
plans in both the MDTN and WDTN than the other districts.  Fifty-seven percent (57%)
of the plans in the MDTN and 85% of the plans in the WDTN had proposed plan lengths 
of 60 months.150 By comparison, 60% of all plans across the seven districts included a 
proposed plan length of 60 months. 
146 M = 52.48 months, SD = 11.47, SEM = .587.
147 M = 52.49 months, SD = 11.33, SEM = .972), t(516) = -.010,  p = .992.
148
  Supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text and Table 23.
149
  Because only seven cases in NDGA included specific plan lengths, the data from this district were 
excluded from the analysis concerning district-level differences in proposed length of plans.
150 F(5,574) = 8.00, p # .001, 02 = .065. Levene’s test for heterogeneity of variance was significant, 
F(5,574) = 11.14, p # .001; equality of the variance in proposed plan length should not be assumed across 
the districts. As a result, the post-hoc comparisons were completed using Dunnett’s T3 test that does not 
assume equality of variances.
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Table 38.  Inter-District Comparisons of Proposed Length of Debtor Plans (in 
Months)
District N Mean SD SEM Mode 10% 25% Median 75% 90%
MD 92
(8 missing)
51.82 15.32 1.60 60 36 48 60 60 60
MDNC 92
(8 missing)
47.30 10.56 1.10 36 36 36 48 60 60
MDTN 98
(2 missing)
54.00 9.47 0.95 60 36 49 60 60 60
SDGA 92
(8 missing)
51.35 10.62 1.11 60 36 36 60 60 60
WDPA 87
(13 missing)
52.75 14.07 1.51 60 36 48 60 60 60
WDTN 119
(11 missing)




4. Time Spent in Chapter 13
Predictably, debtors who completed their plans spent significantly more time in 
Chapter 13 than debtors whose cases were dismissed or converted, either before or after 
confirmation; and debtors who achieved confirmation of a plan spent significantly more 
time in Chapter 13 than debtors whose cases were dismissed or converted before 
confirmation.152  Thus, as shown in Table 39 below, debtors who obtained a discharge 
spent on average more than twice as much time in Chapter 13 – 48.7 months – as debtors 
whose cases were dismissed or converted after confirmation – 20.4 and 21.5 months, 
respectively.  Debtors whose cases were dismissed or converted before confirmation of a 
plan spent an average of only 6.2 and 3.1 months, respectively, in Chapter 13. 
The very short time spent in Chapter 13 by debtors whose cases were converted 
before confirmation may reflect that most conversions were sought by the debtor and did 
not require a court hearing.153  Likewise, the relatively short 25th percentile, median, and 
75th percentiles (2.5, 3.4, 4.7 months), and longer mean (6.22 months) and high standard 
deviation (9.74), for cases dismissed before confirmation also suggest that most of these 
cases are voluntarily dismissed, without a hearing;154 or dismissed for failure to timely 
file a plan, or schedules or other required papers; or dismissed for failure to commence 
151 Most of the missing cases were from NDGA, because the case records  indicate plans of indefinite 
length (e.g., “36-60 months”).
152
  The effect of disposition on time in Chapter 13 is confirmed by ANOVA. Disposition was significantly 
related to time spent in Chapter 13, F (4,765) = 273.02, p # .001, 02 = .588. Scheffe’ tests at an alpha level 
of .05 revealed three subsets---Discharged cases spent the greatest amount of time in Chapter 13, cases 
either converted or dismissed after confirmation spent a moderate amount of time in Chatper 13, and cases 
either converted or dismissed before confirmation spent the least amount of time in Chapter 13.
153
  See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (permitting conversion by the debtor to Chapter 7 as a matter of right).
154
  See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) (permitting the debtor to dismiss as a matter of right, unless the case has 
previously been converted from another chapter).
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making timely payments under the plan.155  Such dismissals normally would occur more 
quickly than contested dismissals.
Table 39.  Case Disposition and Time in Chapter 13 (in months)
N Range Mean SD SEM 25% Median 75%
Discharged 259 (3 missing) 3.30 - 78.83 48.66 15.65 0.972 39 50.7 61.5
Dismissed After 
Confirmation 290 (11 missing) 2.37 - 69.6 20.41 14.54 0.854 10.5 16.4 25.7
Dismissed Before 
Confirmation 154 (0 missing) 0.4  - 59.6 6.22 9.74 0.785 2.5 3.4 4.7
Converted After 
Confirmation 47 (7 missing) 4.0 - 61.7 21.5 15.48 2.21 8.6 18 30.7
Converted Before 
Confirmation 20 (3 missing) 0.7 - 10.00 3.12 1.95 0.435 2 2.75 3.4
ALL CASES 770 (25 missing) 0.4 - 78.8 26.7 21.72 0.783 6.7 20.3 44.2
Finally, according to Table 39 above, almost a quarter of debtors who achieved a 
Chapter 13 discharge completed their plans within 39 months, and 50% completed their 
plans within about 51 months.  Fifty percent (50%) of debtors who attained a discharge 
spent more than 51 months in Chapter 13.  As further reported in Table 40 below, an 
analysis of the difference between actual time spent in Chapter 13 and proposed plan 
length by debtors who completed their plans indicates that 25% of these debtors spent at 
least five month less time in Chapter 13 than originally proposed, while 25% spent more 
than six months more than anticipated.  On average, debtors who attained a discharge 
spent almost two months more in Chapter 13 than their plans proposed. These data 
suggest that policies permitting plan extensions would tend to promote plan completion.  
Finally, and predictably, there was a very large disparity between proposed plan length 
and actual time spent in Chapter 13 by debtors who did not complete their plans.
Table 40.  Case Disposition and Disparity Between Proposed Plan Length and 
Actual Time in Chapter 13 (in months)
N Range Mean SD SEM 25% Median 75%
Discharged 201 (61 missing) -54.6* – 30.5 -1.04 14.74 1.04 -5.02 1.97 6.48
All Cases
559 
(236 missing) -59.6 –  30.5 -23.8 23.94 1.01 -46.03 -25.33 -0.17
D. Other Variables
Countless variables bear on case outcomes in Chapter 13 that we do not consider 
in this paper.  Other, more targeted studies, have examined several other factors.  In her 
study of the impact of debtor education on case outcomes in Chapter 13, Professor Jean 
Braucher found that debtor education did not have a positive effect on case outcome, 
while routine use of wage orders and amount of attorney fees had a positive impact on 
155
  See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c), (3), (9), (10).
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case completion.156 Another study, by Michael Catrett, found that Chapter 13 cases filed 
on or the day before “foreclosure day” in the Houston Division of the Southern District of 
Texas, were less likely to result in discharge than cases filed at other times of the 
month.157  Gordon Bermant has examined the effect of making ongoing mortgage 
payments through the plan on plan completion, hypothesizing that the practice promotes 
plan completion but finding the data inconclusive.158
VII. DEBT COLLECTION IN CHAPTER 13
This Part considers the amounts and types of claims paid by debtors in the 
Chapter 13 system.  First, we report and assess data collected by the Executive Office for 
United States Trustees (EOUST) and the Administrative Office of the Courts (AO) (for 
trustees in North Carolina and Alabama, which are not part of the United States Trustee 
system) regarding disbursements by standing Chapter 13 trustees across the country 
during 1994-2003. Next, we review and compare the national data with EOUST, AO and 
Project data on disbursements by the Chapter 13 trustees in the seven districts covered by 
the Project.  This comparison confirms that distributions to creditors in the sample 
districts are very similar to the national averages. Finally, this Part reports on the 
repayment of claims by the debtors in the sample cases. 
In summary, both the EOUST and AO data on trustee disbursements nationally 
and the Project data on the sample cases reveal that secured creditors are by far the 
principal beneficiaries of the Chapter 13 system, and that disbursements to priority and 
general unsecured creditors are modest.  Naturally, creditor repayment is significantly 
related to whether the debtor obtained confirmation of a plan, whether the debtor 
completed the plan, and the length of time the debtor spent in Chapter 13.  Even so, 
debtors who completed their plans repaid a median amount of just $630 per year in 
general unsecured claims.  In all cases, the median disbursement to unsecured creditors 
was $0, and in cases with a confirmed plan, the median was $14.  Chapter 13 costs 
deducted from debtors’ plan payments comprise 15-18% of total disbursements.  
156
  Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 
Completion Not Shown, 9 A.B.I. L. J. 557, 577-579 (2001). 
157
  Michael Catrett, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, A Month of Debtors, “Foreclosure Tuesday” and the 
Rush to Chapter 13 in the Houston Division of the Southern District of Texas, ABI J. (May 2005), p. 24.  
158
  See Gordon Bermant, Making Post-Petition Mortgage Payments Through the Plan: A Survey of 
Standing Chapter 13 Trustees, A First Draft Report of Survey Results to the Endowment Committee of the 
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges (July 2004) (manuscript on file with the author) (reporting on 
survey of standing Chapter 13 trustees regarding practices respecting payment of mortgages under the 
plan);see also Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Chapter 13 Disbursements in 
Fiscal Year 2001: Continued Growth and a New Finding, ABI J. (Feb. 2003), pp. 24, 52 (questioning 
whether the practice enhances plan completion); Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the
Numbers, Chapter 13: Who Pays the Mortgage?, ABI J. (June 2001), p. 20 (reporting that “in 1999, one-
third (58/175) of the standing trustees were making ongoing mortgage payments for at least some of their 
cases”).
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A. Chapter 13 Trustee Disbursements -- the National Data
1. Disbursements to Creditors, and Chapter 13 Costs
Table 41 below details disbursements to creditors by the standing Chapter 13 
trustees in the United States Trustee Program (USTP) for each of the past ten fiscal years, 
1994-2003.159  Total disbursements to creditors have increased substantially and steadily 
over these ten years, from $1,654,139,757 in 1994 to $3,578,582,446 in 2003.  Adjusted 
for inflation,160 this is a 74% increase in disbursements, which primarily reflects the 
96.1% increase in the numbers of Chapter 13 filings over the same period.161 Adjusted 
for inflation, trustee disbursements to secured and unsecured creditors increased by 
nearly 95% and 69%, respectively, between 1994 and 2003; and trustee disbursements to 
priority claimants decreased over the ten years, by almost 10%.
Chapter 13 costs (debtor attorney fees, §503 and noticing expenses, and, most 
significantly, trustee expenses and compensation162) in the USTP have increased at a 
159
  The U.S. Trustee Program covers all Chapter 13 trusteeships in the United States except those in North 
Carolina and  Alabama.  Over the past six years, Ed Flynn, in the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees, and 
Gordon Bermant, formerly of the EOUST and now a private consultant, have written a regular column 
(“Bankruptcy by the Numbers”) in the American Bankruptcy Institute Journal on data collected by the 
EOUST from Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases.  In regard to Chapter 13, their columns include: Gordon 
Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Chapter 13 Disbursements in Fiscal Year 2001: 
Continued Growth and a New Finding, ABI J. (Feb. 2003), p. 24; Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, 
Bankruptcy by the Numbers, A Tale of Two Chapters, Part I (July/Aug. 2002), p. 20 (reporting on Chapter 
13 filings relative to population in 2001 and total paid out in Chapter 13 cases compared to Chapter 7 cases 
in 2001); Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Chapter 13 Disbursements in Fiscal 
Year 2000: Steady Growth, ABI J. (Nov. 2001), p. 20; Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the 
Numbers, Chapter 13: Who Pays the Mortgage?, ABI J. (June 2001), p. 20; Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, 
Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Sources of Variability in Chapter 13 Performance, ABI J. (Apr. 2001), p. 20; 
Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Stability and Change in Chapter 13 Activity, 
1990-1999, ABI J. (Nov. 2000), p. 20; Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, 
Measuring Projected Performance in Chapter 13: Comparisons Across the States, ABI J. (July/Aug. 2000), 
p. 22 (reporting on Chapter 13 filings, trustee distributions to creditors, and per case distributions to 
creditors, broken down by high five, middle six and low five states in FY 1998); Gordon Bermant and Ed 
Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Distributions and Expenses in Chapter 13, ABI J. (May 2000), p. 22 
(reporting on trustee distributions to creditors and trustee expenses in FY 1998); Gordon Bermant and Ed 
Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, A Small New Window on Outcomes in Chapter 13, ABI J. (Mar. 
2000), p. 22 (commenting on Norberg study of Chapter 13 cases in the Southern District of Mississippi); 
Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Exploring the Demographics of Consumer Chapter Choice, 
ABI J. (May 1999), p. 20 (considering chapter choice by debtors in different jurisdictions based on 
bankruptcy filings per 1000 households in the jurisdiction).
160
  Adjustments for inflation in this section and elsewhere in the article were made using the Consumer 
Price Index inflation calculator located at http://www.bls.gov/. 
161
  See infra note 166.  As suggested by the fact that the percentage increase in disbursements is less than 
the percentage increase in filings indicates, average per case disbursements are somewhat lower in 2003 
than in 1994.  Average per case disbursements are discussed more fully infra, notes 166-169 and 
accompanying text and Table 42.  It should also be noted that the amounts of mortgage debt paid by 
debtors outside instead of inside their plans have increased over this period, perhaps explaining the balance 
of the increases in disbursements to creditors over the period.  See infra note 160.
162
  These are the only costs reported in the EOUST Audited Annual Reports.  They are costs deducted 
from debtor plan payments, therefore, they do not include attorneys’ fees paid in advance of the petition.  
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somewhat greater rate than disbursements to creditors, from $285,531,896 in 1996 to 
$594,675,723 in 2003.  Adjusted for inflation, this represents a nearly 78% increase over 
the eight-year period, compared to a 68% increase in total disbursements to creditors 
(again adjusted for inflation) for the same eight year period.  (The eight-year period 
1996-2003 is used here for Chapter 13 costs, instead of the 10-year period 1994-2003, 
because the EOUST Audited Annual Reports for 1994-1995 do not include figures for 
debtor attorney fees, §503(b) awards and noticing fees, as do the reports for 1996-
2003.163)  
Secured creditors are by far the primary creditor beneficiaries of the Chapter 13 
system.  The percentage of total creditor disbursements by trustees to secured creditors 
ranged between 60% and 69% from 1994 and 2003,164 with an average percentage of 
nearly 65%.  As large as these percentages appear, they substantially understate the 
proportion of all payments by Chapter 13 debtors to secured creditors.  The figures do not 
include debtors’ payments made directly to secured creditors, in particular mortgage 
creditors; in many districts, some or most debtors pay ongoing mortgage and other 
secured claims outside the plan.  Thus, the percentage of all debtor payments to secured 
creditors is significantly greater, and the percentage of debtor payments to priority and 
Nor do they include case filing fees, creditor attorney fees, or judicial bankruptcy court and clerk 
operations, which are hereafter referred to as “other Chapter 13 costs.”  Figures for debtor attorney fees, § 
503(b) awards and noticing costs are not available for 1994 and1995.  The following table shows the 
breakdown of Chapter 13 costs for FY 1994-2003.
Chapter 13 Costs/National, FY 1994-2003
Source: U.S. Trustee Program Chapter 13 Reference Materials, Chapter 13 Statistics, FY-1994-2003 
Chapter 13 Standing Trustee Audited Annual Reports, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/library/chapter13/ch13lib.htm (visited Dec. 14, 2004)
FY
Debtor Attorney Fees, 
503(b) awards, Noticing
Trustee Expenses and 
Compensation
Total Chapter 13 
Costs
1994 Not available 114,868,685
1995 Not available 117,757,752
1996 160,266,397 125,265,499 285,531,896
1997 211,524,484 137,929,713 349,454,197
1998 248,734,366 153,947,829 402,682,195
1999 254,506,127 171,789,891 426,296,018
2000 255,673,005 188,017,901 443,690,906
2001 276,242,675 203,732,646 479,975,321
2002 311,008,507 220,778,288 531,786,795
2003 352,838,946 241,836,777 594,675,723
163
 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
164
  Accord, Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Chapter 13 Disbursements in 
Fiscal Year 2001: Continued Growth and a New Finding, ABI J. (Feb. 2003), p. 24 (observing that 
percentages of disbursements paid to secured, priority and general unsecured creditors was relatively 
constant over time); Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Chapter 13 
Disbursements in Fiscal Year 2000: Steady Growth, ABI J. (Nov. 2001), p. 20 (same, regarding 2000); 
Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Stability and Change in Chapter 13 Activity, 
1990-1999ABI J. (Nov. 2000), pp. 20-21 (same, regarding period 1990-1999).  See also Gordon Bermant 
and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Distributions and Expenses in Chapter 13, ABI J. (May 2000), 
p. 22 (observing large geographical differences in the percentages of distributions to various creditor 
categories).
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general unsecured creditors is correspondingly lesser, than shown in Table 41, which 
includes only disbursements made by the Chapter 13 trustees.  
No more than 30% of trustee disbursements are to general unsecured creditors.  
Between 1994 and 2003, the ratio of general unsecured creditor disbursements to total 
trustee disbursements ranged from 21% to 30%.  (Again, these figures overstate the 
proportion of payments to priority and general unsecured creditors; as discussed above, 
substantial amounts of secured debt were paid directly by debtors.)  The ratio of priority 
unsecured creditor disbursements to total trustee disbursements ranged from 7% to 14%.  
Chapter 13 costs165 are a sizable portion of total trustee distributions to creditors, 
and equal a large percentage of disbursements to general unsecured creditors.  The ratio 
of Chapter 13 costs to total trustee disbursements was quite stable over the years 1994 to 
2003, ranging from 15% to 18%.  The ratio of Chapter 13 costs to total trustee 
disbursements to general unsecured creditors ranged between 59% and 78%, with an 
average percentage of more than 66%.     
165
  See supra note 160 and accompanying text regarding costs that are, and are not, included in “Chapter 13 
costs.”
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1994 1,019,284,401 223,656,042 411,199,314 1,654,139,757 n/a
% Total Trustee Disbursements 62% 14% 25% n/a
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. n/a
1995 1,046,389,221 195,323,850 428,119,256 1,669,832,327 n/a
% Total Trustee Disbursements 63% 12% 26% n/a
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. n/a
1996 1,156,100,247 219,725,022 439,756,339 1,815,581,608 285,531,896
% Total Trustee Disbursements 64% 12% 24% 16%
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 65%
1997 1,382,780,488 244,042,513 465,842,310 2,092,665,311 349,454,197
% Total Trustee Disbursements 66% 12% 22% 17%
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 75%
1998 1,700,257,785 275,462,767 536,423,390 2,512,143,942 402,682,195
% Total Trustee Disbursements 68% 11% 21% 16%
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 75%
1999 1,631,712,848 297,617,217 647,918,439 2,577,248,501 426,296,018
% Total Trustee Disbursements 63% 12% 25% 17%
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 66%
2000 1,955,834,912 290,092,433 753,959,479 2,999,886,824 443,690,906
% Total Trustee Disbursements 65% 10% 25% 15%
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 59%
2001 1,651,694,504 272,376,337 815,847,426 2,739,918,267 479,975,321
% Total Trustee Disbursements 60% 10% 30% 18%
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 59%
2002 2,212,112,114 256,280,549 841,370,358 3,309,763,021 531,786,795
% Total Trustee Disbursements 67% 8% 25% 16%
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 63%
2003 2,465,442,929 251,213,403 861,926,114 3,578,582,446 594,675,723
% Total Trustee Disbursements 69% 7% 24% 17%
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 69%
% increase (adjusted for 
inflation), 1994-2003
95% -10% 69% 74% 78%167
2. Disbursements per Case
No one maintains statistics on average per case disbursements in Chapter 13 
cases, but a reasonably accurate estimate can be computed by dividing the disbursements 
in a given year by the average of all Chapter 13 filings for that and the previous four 
years.168  As shown in Table 42 below, in absolute dollars, average Chapter 13 trustee 
166
  U.S. Trustee Program Chapter 13 Reference Materials, Chapter 13 Statistics, FY-1994-2003 Chapter 13 
Standing Trustee Audited Annual Reports, http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/library/chapter13/ch13lib.htm (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2004).
167
  This is the percent increase for 1996-2003.  Figures for “Chapter 13 costs” in 1994 and 1995 are not 
available, see supra note 135.
168
  See Gordon Berman and Ed Flynn, Estimating the Yield to Creditors in Chapter 13 Cases, http://www. 
usdoj.gov/ust/press/articles/abi102000a.htm. (discussing methodology for computing per case yields in 
Chapter 13 cases, and deriving formula: mean yield per case = yield FY00/Mean filings CY00-CY-04). 
Chapter 13 filings in all districts for the years 1990-2003 are as follows:
58
disbursements to creditors per case in the USTP have increased, albeit somewhat 
erratically, over the ten years 1994-2003.169 When adjusted for inflation, however, 
average total trustee per case distributions to all creditors declined slightly, by 1.4%, 
between 1994 and 2003.  Per case payments to priority and unsecured creditors fell by 
48.8% and 0.4%, respectively.  On the other hand trustee distributions to secured 
creditors were 10.2% higher in 2003 than in 1994.170
As reported in Table 42, the average amount disbursed by standing Chapter 13 
trustees in the USTP to secured creditors in 2003 was $6457 per case, nearly three times 
the average amount disbursed to unsecured creditors, which was $2257 per case.  
Chapter 13 Filings, 1994-2003
Year Chapter 13 Filings – All Districts Chapter 13 Filings – USTP Districts
1990 208,666 -14,045 [AL], -7,160 [NC] 187,461
1991 251,883 -15,995 [AL], -9,771 [NC]  226,117
1992 254,138 -15,411 [AL], -8,320 [NC]  230,407












  Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn have reported calculations on average disbursements per case for some 
of these years.  Their calculations are almost identical to those reported in Table 32.  See Gordon Bermant 
and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Chapter 13 Disbursements in Fiscal Year 2000: Steady 
Growth, ABI J. (Nov. 2001), p. 20, Table 5 (reporting on total disbursements per case, disbursements to 
creditors and disbursements to unsecured creditors in 1998, 1999 and 2000); Gordon Bermant and Ed 
Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Estimating Means-tested Chapter 13 Case Yields from Current Chapter 
13 Performance (June 2000), p. 20 (reporting average disbursements per case to unsecured creditors in 
1998).
170
  Adjusted for inflation, using the Consumer Price Index, average disbursements to creditors in 1994, 
expressed in 2003 dollars, were: $5855 to secured creditors, $1285 to priority creditors, $2361 to general 
unsecured creditors, and $9501 to all creditors combined.  By comparison, average disbursements to 
creditors in 2003 (expressed in 2003 dollars) were: $6457 to secured creditors, $658 to priority creditors, 
$2257 to general unsecured creditors, and $9372 to all creditors combined.  Adjusted for inflation, again 
using the Consumer Price Index, average Chapter 13 costs in 1996, expressed in 2003 dollars, were $1366.  
By comparison, average per cases costs in 2003 were $1557.  Adjustments for inflation were made using 
the Inflation Calculator located at http://www.bls.gov/.  
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1994 1,019,284,401 223,656,042 411,199,314 1,654,139,757 n/a 216,140
Avg. per case 4716 1035 1902 7653
1995 1,046,389,221 195,323,850 428,119,256 1,669,832,327 n/a 228,392
Avg. per case. 4582 855 1874 7311
1996 1,156,100,247 219,725,022 439,756,339 1,815,581,608 285,531,896 245,190
Avg. per case. 4715 896 1794 7405 1165
1997 1,382,780,488 244,042,513 465,842,310 2,092,665,311 349,454,197 270,289
Avg. per case 5116 903 1723 7742 1293
1998 1,700,257,785 275,462,767 536,423,390 2,512,143,942 402,682,195 297,366
Avg. per case 5718 926 1803 8448 1354
1999 1,631,712,848 297,617,217 647,918,439 2,577,248,501 426,296,018 322,778
Avg. per case. 5055 922 2007 7985 1320
2000 1,955,834,912 290,092,433 753,959,479 2,999,886,824 443,690,906 341,681
Avg. per case. 5724 849 2207 8780 1299
2001 1,651,694,504 272,376,337 815,847,426 2,739,918,267 479,975,321 355,773
Avg. per case 4643 766 2293 7701 1349
2002 2,212,112,114 256,280,549 841,370,358 3,309,763,021 531,786,795 367,375
Avg. per case 6021 698 2290 9009 1448
2003 2,465,442,929 251,213,403 861,926,114 3,578,582,446 594,675,723 381,823
Avg. per case. 6457 658 2257 9372 1557
Several factors likely have contributed to the increase in the average trustee 
distributions to secured creditors, and to the decreases in the average trustee distributions 
to general unsecured creditors.  Perhaps most importantly, it appears that over the past 12 
years, more Chapter 13 trustees are administering mortgage payments, and fewer debtors 
are making these payments directly to the mortgagee.  In addition, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Associates Commercial Corporation v. Rash173 may have had the effect of 
shifting some of debtors’ disposable income from payment of unsecured claims to 
payment of secured claims.  The Court in Rash held that the proper valuation standard for 
collateral that the debtor proposes to retain in Chapter 13 is replacement value, not 
liquidation value.  As a result of the decision, in courts that had previously valued 
collateral at something less than “replacement value,” the amount of secured claims, 
which must be paid in full, has increased.174  The 1998 amendments permitting Chapter 
171 Creditor disbursement figures are derived from U.S. Trustee Program Chapter 13 Reference Materials, 
Chapter 13 Statistics, FY-1994-2003 Chapter 13 Standing Trustee Audited Annual Reports, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/library/chapter13/ch13lib.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2004).  Chapter 13 filing 
statistics are published at . . . . Filings in North Carolina and Alabama are excluded because the EOUST 
Audited Annual Reports cover only the USTP trusteeships.
172
  See supra note 164 regarding costs that are, and are not, included in “Chapter 13 costs.”
173
  520 U.S. 953 (1997).
174
  See Norberg, supra note 46, at 439-440 (commenting on future trends in repaying of unsecured debt in 
Chapter 13 cases).  Also, in 1998, Congress passed the Religious Freedom and Charitable Donation 
Protection Act, P.L. 105-183, 112 Stat. 517 (1998), which permits Chapter 13 debtors to donate up to 15% 
of their gross incomes to charity.  Again, this change might have had the effect of decreasing distributions 
to unsecured creditors.  See Norberg, supra note 46, at 440.
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13 debtors to make charitable and religious contributions also may have somewhat 
decreased distributions to unsecured creditors.175
B. Chapter 13 Trustee Disbursements in the Seven Sample Districts/EOUST 
and AO Data
Tables 43 and 44 indicate that the seven sample districts closely resemble the 
nation with respect to (a) the ratio of trustee disbursements to secured, priority and 
unsecured creditors to total trustee disbursements, (b) the increases in disbursements over 
the period 1994-2003, and (c) the ratio of Chapter 13 costs to total creditor and to 
unsecured creditor disbursements.  As with disbursements to creditors in all districts,176
disbursements to creditors in the seven sample districts primarily benefited secured 
creditors.  In 1994, just over 60% of Chapter 13 trustee disbursements went to secured 
creditors in the seven sample districts, compared to 62% in all USTP districts.  In 2003, 
74.4% of trustee disbursements went to secured creditors in the sample districts, 
compared to 69% in all USTP districts.  As is the case for all USTP districts,177 these data
for the seven sample districts substantially understate payments to secured creditors 
because they do not include debtor payments outside the plan.  In 1994, debtors in three 
of the seven districts in the Project – the Northern District of Georgia, Southern District 
of Georgia, and District of Maryland – typically paid ongoing mortgage payments (but 
not mortgage arrearages) outside the plan, and currently debtors in Maryland generally do 
not make ongoing mortgage payments through their plans.178
Total trustee disbursements to creditors in the seven sample districts increased 
from $319,984,097 in 1994 to $727,390,828 in 2003.  Adjusted for inflation, this is an 
83% increase, compared to 74% nationally.  Disbursements to unsecured creditors rose 
from $66,798,014 to 133,855,268.  Adjusted for inflation, this is a 76% increase, 
compared to 69% nationally. 
In FY2003, in six of the seven sample districts,179 Chapter 13 costs in the USTP 
were $83,483,018, equal to 13.8% of total payments to creditors and 71.8% of payments 
to general unsecured creditors. As discussed above, nationally, in 2003, total Chapter 13
costs comprised 16.6% of all disbursements and equaled 70% of payments to general
unsecured creditors.  
175
  11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A)(ii) provides that “disposable income” that must be committed to a plan does 
not include “amounts reasonably necessary to be expended for charitable contributions . . . in an amount 
not to exceed 15 percent of gross income of the debtor . . .  .”
176
  See supra note 166 and accompanying text and Table 41.
177
  See id.
178
  It also appears that in 1994 in the Western District of Tennessee, disbursements to some secured 
creditors were reported as disbursements to priority claimants.
179
  The Middle District of North Carolina is excluded from the calculations here because Chapter 13 costs 
were not available for two of the three trustees in that district.
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Table 43.  Chapter 13 Trustee Disbursements/Sample Districts, FY 1994180
District Secured Priority Unsecured Total Trustee 
Disbursements to 
Creditors
WDPA [1 trustee] $10,403,822 $1,440,902 $1,938,179 $13,782,903
% 75.5 10.4 14.1 100.0
DMD [2 trustees] $10,489,863 $3,365,856 $7,973,861 $21,829,580
% 48.1 15.4 36.5 100.0
WDTN [3 trustees] $35,548,973 $44,387,550 $12,636,438 $92,572,961
% 38.4 47.9 13.7 100.00
MDTN [2 trustees] $48,270,109 $4,497,699 $16,839,363 $69,607,171
% 69.3 6.5 24.2 100.0
SDGA [2 trustees] $22,199,605 $1,428,262 $7,978,796 $31,606,663
% 70.2 4.5 25.2 100.0
NDGA [2 trustees] $66,064,393 $5,089,049 $19,431,377 $90,524,819
% 73.0 5.6 21.5 100.0
MDNC [3 trustees] $38,003,785 $2,243,266 $10,119,396 $50,366,447
% 75.5 4.5 20.1 100.0
Total [7 districts/15 
trustees]
$192,976,765 $60,209,318 $66,798,014 $319,984,097
% 60.3 18.8 20.9 100.0
180 U.S. Trustee Program Chapter 13 Reference Materials, Chapter 13 Statistics, FY1994 Chapter 13 
Standing Trustee Audited Annual Report, http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/library/chapter13/ch13lib.htm (visited 
Dec. 14, 2004).  The Audited Annual Report for FY 1994 itemizes trustee expenses and compensation, but 
not debtor attorney fees, § 503(b) awards, and noticing costs.  Thus, “Chapter 13 costs” are not included in 
this Table because they are not comparable to these costs as reported in the other tables in this Part.
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WDPA [1 trustee] $33,531,809 $2,524,020 $3,319,329 $39,375,158 3,405,299
% Total Trustee Disbursements 85.2 6.4 8.4 100.0 8.6
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 102.5
DMD [4 trustees] $35,757,547 $8,395,187 $27,061,911 $71,214,645 9,791,328
% Total Trustee Disbursements 50.2 11.8 38.0 100.0 13.7
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 36.2
WDTN [3 trustees] $149,504,123 $8,435,127 $25,305,756 $183,245,012 18,676,913
% Total Trustee Disbursements 81.6 4.6 13.8 100.0 10.2
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 73.8
MDTN [1 trustee] $77,258,620 $5,594,587 $17,798,404 $100,651,611 8,264,390
% Total Trustee Disbursements 76.8 5.5 17.7 100.0 8.2
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 46.4
SDGA [2 trustees] $53,357,982 $2,919,875 $15,283,964 $71,561,821 14,292,572
% Total Trustee Disbursements 74.6 4.1 21.4 100.0 20.0
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 93.5
NDGA [2 trustees] $99,603,676 $10,009,867 $27,569,736 $137,183,279 29,052,516
% Total Trustee Disbursements 72.6 7.3 20.1 100.0 21.2
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 105.4
Total [6 Districts/13 trustees –
excl. MDNC*]
116,339,100 603,231,526 83,483,018
% Total Trustee Disbursements 13.8
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 71.8
MDNC [3 trustees] $103,825,645 $2,817,500 $17,516,156 $124,159,302 n/a
% Total Trustee Disbursements 83.6 2.3 14.1 100.0 n/a
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. n/a
Total [7 Districts/16 trustees] $552,893,402 $40,696,169 $133,855,268 $727,390,828






% Total Trustee Disbursements 68.9 7.0 24.1 100.0 16.6
% Disbursements to Uns.Creds. 70.0
C. Trustee Disbursements in the Seven Sample Districts/Project Data
1. Allowed Claims
Table 45 below sets out the amounts of allowed secured, priority, general, other 
and total claims in the sample cases.  Secured claims made up nearly 49% of all allowed 
claims (but, again, the Table understates these claims because the data do not include 
some claims to be paid outside a plan; in districts where claims may be paid outside the 
181 U.S. Trustee Program Chapter 13 Reference Materials, Chapter 13 Statistics, FY-2003 Chapter 13 
Standing Trustee Audited Annual Report, http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/library/chapter13/ch13lib.htm (visited 
Dec. 14, 2004).
182 MDNC is excluded from the calculations in this column because Chapter 13 costs are not available for 
two of  the three trustees in that district.
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plan, such claims usually are (relatively quite) large mortgage claims.  Nearly 42% of the 
total allowed claims were general unsecured claims.  According to the trustee data, 
priority and other claims comprised 7.8% and 4.5%, respectively, of total allowed claims.  
(In some trusteeships, however, the “priority” and “other” claims categories include at 
least some post petition, administrative expense claims, most importantly attorneys’ fees.  
As a result, meaningful analysis of the extent of payment of prepetition priority and other 
claims was not possible.183)
Table 45.  Allowed Claims in All Sample Cases






2. Disbursements per Case and Overall in Chapter 13 Project Cases
a. All Sample Cases
As reported in Table 46 below, debtors in the sample Chapter 13 cases paid an 
average of $9,406 per case under their Chapter 13 plans.184  The median was much lower, 
$2,718, and the standard deviation was large, $16,207, indicating that a relatively few 
debtors repaid substantially greater amounts of debt.  The positively skewed distribution 
around the mean is further reflected in the minimal 10th and 25th percentile amounts of $0 
and $22, respectively; and the relatively large 75th and 90th percentile amounts of $11,326 
and $28,490.  The standard error of the mean is relatively low, so the confidence level is 
high; the mean is accurate to within plus or minus $581, or approximately 6%, of the 
mean.185
Secured Claims.  Not counting any debtor payments directly to secured creditors 
(outside the plan), secured creditors collected an average of $6,593 per case.  Again, the 
lower median amount of $1,141 collected by secured creditors, and the high standard 
deviation, $12,835, nearly two times the mean, indicate that a relatively fewer number of 
debtors paid higher amounts of secured debt.  Thus, at the 75th percentile, creditors 
183
  See also Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Sources of Variability in Chapter 
13 Performance, ABI J. (Apr. 2001) (stating that “there are good reasons to believe . . . that this category 
[priority claims] is treated differently in different districts, so the exact extent of priority debt and 
repayment is not completely clear at the national level”).
184
  This compares to $24,294 in average allowed claims per case.  See supra notes 38-40 and 
accompanying text and Table 8.
185
  Again, the figures in Table 46 somewhat understates the debt repaid by Chapter 13 debtors because the 
trustee and court file data do not track payments made outside the plan directly to creditors.  In some 
districts, debtors sometimes or routinely paid certain claims – usually mortgage claims and occasionally 
other secured claims – outside the plan.  
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collected $6,877, barely more than the mean of $6,593; and at the 90th percentile, 
creditors collected $20,241, approximately three times the mean.
Priority Claims.  In a large majority of cases (515 of 784, or 66%), the debtors 
paid no priority debt, thus there is a non-normal distribution in these Table 46 figures.  
While debtors paid an average of $1,110 per case, the median was $0 and the 75th
percentile was only $117.  As the standard deviation ($4560, or four times the mean) and 
90th percentile ($2,389) figures indicate, a very few debtors paid the vast bulk of the 
priority debt that was repaid by the debtors in the sample.  As noted above, however, this 
data must be viewed with caution because different districts report the extent and 
repayment of priority debt somewhat differently.
General Unsecured Claims.  The debtors repaid an average of $1,683 of 
unsecured debt per case.  The data reveal that a relatively fewer number of debtors repaid 
a relatively larger amount of unsecured debt.  The median amount of unsecured debt 
repaid by debtors was $0 – in other words, half of all of the Chapter 13 debtors in the 
sample paid nothing to unsecured creditors.  The standard deviation was $4,261, or nearly 
two and one-half times the mean.  The 75th percentile amount, $1,401, was similar to the 
mean of $1,683.      





$0 Range Mean SD SEM 10% 25% Median 75% 90%
Secured 785 (10 missing) 270 (34%) $0 - $108096 $6,593 $12,835 458 $0 $0 $1,141 $6,877 $20,241
Priority 784 (11 missing) 515 (65%) $0 - $54598* $1,110 $4,560 162.84 $0 $0 $0 $117 $2,389
General 784  (11 missing) 473 (59%) $0 - $57714 $1,683 $4,261 152 $0 $0 $0 $1,401 $5,662
Total 776 (19 missing) 188 (24%) $0 - $131886 $9,406 $16,207 581.8 $0 $22 $2,718 $11,326 $28,490
As shown in Table 47 below, overall, more than 70% of the payments by Chapter 
13 debtors under their plans went to secured creditors.187  Payments to priority creditors 
were nearly 12%, and payments to general unsecured creditors comprised 19.5%, of total 
payments to creditors inside the plan.  
Table 47 also shows the percent of each type of claim paid by the debtors in the 
study sample.  They paid a modest 30% of allowed secured claims, and a somewhat 
lesser 19.5% of unsecured claims.  We have omitted repayment of priority claims from 
the Table because of the variability among districts in what is included in this category
and the fact that some of the districts included post petition administrative expense 
claims, in particular attorneys’ fees, in this category.
186 Due to the non-normality of these distributions, assumption-freer analyses are used (Kruskal-Wallis and 
median test; see infra note 137).
187
  As noted elsewhere, the available data do no reflect direct payments to creditors outside the plan, so the 
70% figure understates the percentage of payments by Chapter 13 debtors to secured creditors.
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Table 47.  Overall Creditor Collections: All Cases
Secured Priority General All Claims
Total Allowed Amount $16,928,389 $1,014,124 $6,780,540 $24,262,802
Total Payments $5,175,346 $870,931 $1,320,110 $7,299,525
% of Allowed Claims Paid 30.6% 19.5% 30.1%
% of Total Payments 70.9% 11.9% 18.1% 100.0
b. Cases With a Confirmed Plan 
Perhaps the better measure of creditor repayment in Chapter 13 is debtor 
payments in cases in which the court confirmed a plan.  Some debtors may have filed for 
Chapter 13 relief only to obtain short-term protection of the automatic stay and without the 
intention to confirm a Chapter 13 plan, or for more benign reasons were unable to propose 
a confirmable plan.  Excluding cases dismissed without confirmation of a plan, the average 
trustee disbursements to creditors naturally were greater than the average in all cases.  
Thus, as shown in Table 48, the trustees disbursed an average of $11,858 to all creditors in 
cases with a confirmed plan.  They disbursed an average of $8,356 to secured creditors, 
$1,419 to priority creditors, and $2,155 to general unsecured creditors.  The median 
amounts paid to all, secured, priority and general unsecured creditors were $5,308, $2,667, 
$0 and $14, respectively.  (Table 52 below compares disbursements to the various classes 
of creditors in all cases with disbursements in cases with a confirmed plan and completed 
cases.)  The larger average amounts indicate that relatively few debtors paid greater 
amounts of each category of debt.  Even so, the fact remains that one half of all debtors 
who confirmed a plan paid essentially nothing to unsecured creditors.  
Table 48.  Creditor Collections Per Case: Cases with a Confirmed Plan188
Claims N # cases 
with value 
= $0
Range Mean SD SEM 10% 25% Median 75%
Secured 610 (7 
missing)
120 (19%) $0 - $108,096 $8,356 $14,049 568.83 $0 $229 $2,667 $9,685
Priority 610 (7 
missing)
351 (57%) $0 - $54,598 $1,419 $5,126 207.57 $0 $0 $0 $589
General 610 (7 
missing)
302 (49%) $0 - $57,714 $2,155 $4,725 191.31 $0 $0 $14 $2,650
Total 602 (15 
missing)
45 (7%) $92 - $131,886 $11,858 $17,334 706.47 $92 $1,333 $5,308 $15,155
As discussed in greater detail above, the courts confirmed plans in 77.2% of the 
sample cases.  Thirty- three percent (33%) of all debtors, comprising 42.7% of those with 
confirmed plans, completed their plans and received a discharge.  Notably, as shown in 
Table 48, the percentage of secured claims paid in cases with a confirmed plan was 
substantially higher than the percentage of secured claims paid in all cases.  Whereas the 
188 Due to the non-normality of these distributions, assumption-freer analyses are used (Kruskal-Wallis and 
median test).
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figure for all cases was 30.6% (see Table 47 above), it was 74% in cases with a 
confirmed plan (see Table 49).  This differential reflects the facts that secured claims 
must be paid 100 cents on the dollar (plus interest), whereas unsecured claims may be 
paid at a lower rate; and that the trustee normally distributes debtor payments first to 
secured creditors and then, after secured claims have been paid, to general unsecured 
creditors, so that in many cases that were dismissed before discharge, the debtors paid at
least some secured debt but little or no unsecured debt.
More striking, as further reported in Table 49 below, unsecured creditors 
collected very little more in cases with a confirmed plan than in all cases.  In cases with a 
confirmed plan, general unsecured creditors collected 20.2% of their claims, compared to 
19.5% in all cases. The proportion of trustee distributions to general unsecured creditors 
was almost identical in the two groups – 18.1% of trustee distributions were to unsecured 
creditors in all cases, compared to 18.0% in cases with a confirmed plan.
Table 49.  Overall Creditor Collections: Cases with a Confirmed Plan
Secured Priority General All Claims
Total Allowed Amount $6,889,310 $923,359 $6,498,841 $14,701,826
Total Payments $5,097,420 $865,732 $1,314,433 $7,138,380
% of Allowed Claims Paid 74.0% 93.8% 20.2% 48.6%
% of Total Payments 69.8% 11.9% 18.0% 97.8%
c. Completed Cases
Naturally, the debtors who completed their plans paid greater amounts and 
percentages of their pre-bankruptcy debt than those whose cases were dismissed short of 
discharge.189  Tables 50 and 51 detail creditor collections per case, and overall, in cases in 
which the debtor obtained a discharge.   As shown in Table 50, the Chapter 13 trustees in 
the Project districts disbursed an average of $18,413 to all claimants in completed cases.  
They disbursed an average of $13,068 to secured creditors, $1,732 to priority creditors, 
and 4,696 to general creditors.  The median trustee disbursements to all, secured, priority 
and general unsecured creditors were $11,697, $6,806, $0 and $3,151, respectively.  
189
  Accord, Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Measuring Projected 
Performance in Chapter 13: Comparisons Across the States, ABI J. (July/Aug. 2000), p. 22 (analyzing 1998 
data on trustee disbursements, concluding that “returns to unsecured creditors are higher when plans are 
completed”).
67




= $0 Range Mean SD SEM 10% 25% Median 75% 90%
Secured 258 (4 missing) 47 (18%) $0 - $108096 $13,068 $17,434 1085.4 $0 $904 $6,806 $17,777 $39,012
Priority 256 (6 missing) 136 (52%) $0 - $46500 $1,732 $5,486 342.9 $0 $0 $0 $963 $3,326
General 260 (2 missing) 25 (10%) $0 - $57714 $4,696 $6,315 391.7 $10 $687 $3,151 $5,962 $10,701
Total 253 (9 missing) 12 (5%) $0 - $129541 $18,413 $19,999 1257.32 $1,539 $5,633 $11,697 $25,579 $42,384
* due to the non-normality of these distributions, assumption-freer analyses are used (kruskal-wallis & median test; see table 6)
As shown in Table 51, with completion of a plan, the debtors paid over 100% of 
their secured and priority debts, reflecting the Code mandates for full payment, with 
interest, of such claims.  Unsecured creditors collected 34.1% of their claims.  Overall, 
creditors collected nearly 64% of their claims.
Table 51.  Creditor Collections: Completed Cases
Secured Priority General All Claims
Total Allowed Amount $3,080,838 $385,498 $3,583,771 $6,948,585
Total Payments $3,371,682 $443,488 $1,221,003 $4,658,559
% of Allowed Claims Paid 109.4% 115.0% 34.1% 67.0%
% of Total Payments 63.8% 
Finally, Table 52 below compares disbursements to the various classes of 
creditors in all cases with disbursements in cases with a confirmed plan and completed 
cases.  
Table 52.  Creditor Collections: Comparison of Average and Median Amounts 
Disbursed in All Cases, Cases with Confirmed Plan and Completed Plans
All Cases Confirmed Plan Completed Plan
Mean Secured $6,593 $8,356 $13,068
Median Secured $1,141 $2,667 $6,806
Mean Priority $1,110 $1,419 $1,732
Median Priority $0 $0 $0 
Mean General $1,683 $2,155 $4,696
Median General $0 $14 $3,151
Mean Total $9,406 $11,858 $18,413
Median Total $2,718 $5,308 $11,697
3. Relationship Between Case Disposition and Creditor Repayment
Predictably, case disposition was significantly related to the amount and type of 
debt repaid by the debtors in the sample cases.  The more time a debtor spent in Chapter 
13, the more debt she was likely to repay.  As reported in Table 53 below, using a 
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Spearman’s rho statistical analysis, due to the abnormal distribution in the amounts of 
debt repaid by the debtors, time in Chapter 13 accounted for nearly 75% of the variance 
in the total amount of debt (both principal and interest) that the debtors repaid.  The 
relationship between time in Chapter 13 and the repayment of secured and unsecured 
debt separately was not so strong; time in Chapter 13 accounted for just over 50% of the 
variance in each of the amounts of these debts repaid by the debtors.





for (rho^2) valid N
r : time in ch 13 and total debt (P&I) repaid 0.864 <.001 74.6% 753
r : time in ch 13 and total principal repaid 0.861 <.001 74.1% 753
r : time in ch 13 and secured debt (P&I)repaid 0.722 <.001 52.1% 761
r : time in ch 13 and gen. Unsecured debt (P&I) repaid 0.715 <.001 51.1% 761
r : time in ch 13 and priority debt (P&I) repaid 0.427 <.001 18.2% 760
r : time in ch 13 and other debt (P&I) repaid 0.089 <=.013 0.8% 770
Spearman's rho is used b/c debt repaid is not normally distributed
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APPENDIX A
THE CHAPTER 13 PROJECT
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
A. The Study Sample and Choice of Districts
The Chapter 13 Project is an empirical study of 795 Chapter 13 cases filed in 
1994 in seven federal judicial districts comprising 14 Chapter 13 trusteeships.  While we 
did not select the districts randomly, neither did we choose them based on any sense of 
how debtors and creditors in these districts fare in Chapter 13 cases.  We chose the 
districts for several, mostly practical, reasons.  (1) Collectively, these seven districts 
accounted for a very large portion – nearly 20% -- of Chapter 13 filings nationally in 
1994.  (2) Almost all of the Chapter 13 trustees in these districts use the same case 
management database system.  The original plan for the study was to use specially-
designed software to import into a common database information for all cases and all 
trustees in 14 federal judicial districts.  Unfortunately, the extraction program proved 
unworkable, and the Project therefore fell back to manually collecting all of the data and 
coding them into the Project database.  We therefore reduced the number of districts in 
the study from 14 to seven, and selected a sample of cases from each of the seven 
districts.  (3) Cases in two of the seven districts have been the subject of previous 
studies,190 providing some additional external checks of the validity of the Project’s 
findings.  (4) Case file information for these seven districts could be collected primarily 
from two Federal Records Centers (in East Point, Georgia, and Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania), thereby limiting the costs of data collection. 
The proportion of Chapter 13 filings in the districts covered by the Project was 
considerably higher than the proportion nationally.  As reported in the following Table, in 
the seven judicial districts covered by the Chapter 13 Project, there were 79,688 
consumer bankruptcy filings in 1994, with 47,393, or 59.5%, under Chapter 13.  
Nationally, there were 778,190 consumer bankruptcy filings in 1994.  Of these, 240,639, 
or nearly 31%, were Chapter 13 filings.191  The ratio of Chapter 13 filings to total 
190
  See Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 
Completion Not Shown, 9 A.B.I. L. J. 557, 577-579 (2001) (study of Chapter 13 cases filed in five judicial 
districts in 1994 and 1997, including the Middle District of North Carolina); Teresa A. Sullivan, et al., 
Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991, 68 Am. 
Bankr. L. J. 121 (1994) (reporting on study of chapter 7 and 13 cases filed in 1991 in ten judicial districts, 
including the Western District of Pennsylvania); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., As We Forgive Our Debtors 
(1989) (reporting on study of chapter 7 and 13 cases filed in 1981 in the same judicial districts, including
the Western District of Pennsylvania); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Folklore and Facts: A Preliminary Report 
from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, 60 Am. Bankr. L. J. 293, 324 (1986) (same). 
191
  See infra note 3.  See generally Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Thoughts 
on the “Local Legal Culture,” The Case of Consumer Chapter Choice, ABI J. (Feb. 2002) (reviewing data 
on the variation among districts and states in percentages of consumer debtors who choose Chapter 13 or 
Chapter 7); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Who Uses Chapter 13? (2001) 
(paper presented at annual meeting of the Law and Society Association, Budapest, on file with the author) 
(analyzing various factors influencing choice of chapter, based on data in 1981, 1991 and 1999 studies); 
Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, A Tale of Two Chapters, Part I (July/Aug. 
2002), p. 20 (same); Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers, Exploring the Demographics of 
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consumer filings was above the national average in five districts of the sample districts, 
and below the national average in two – the District of Maryland and the Western District 
of Pennsylvania.192
Consumer Bankruptcy Filings, 1994
District Total Consumer Filings Chapter 13 Filings Percent Chapter 13 
Filings
NDGA 24,686 16,466 66.6%
SDGA 6,822 5,173 75.8%
MDTN 8,648 4,794 55.4%
WDTN 16,083 12,972 80.7%
MDNC 4,201 3,161 75.2%
WDPA 4,976 840 16.9%
DMD 14,272 3,987 27.9%
Seven Districts 79,688 47,393 59.5%
United States 778,190 240,639 30.9%
B. Data Collection and Coding
The Project relied on data from Chapter 13 trustee records; selected portions of 
the bankruptcy court case files; and PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic 
Records)193, an on-line, electronic public-access service maintained by the bankruptcy 
court clerk’s office in each district that allows users to obtain case and docket 
information, including information on other bankruptcy filings by a bankruptcy debtor.  
In addition, we surveyed the Chapter 13 trustees in the seven districts covered by the 
study regarding relevant district and trustee practices in effect in 1994.  The Project did 
not collect data from any other sources, for example, debtor questionnaires or interviews.  
While almost all of the Chapter 13 trustees in the districts covered by the study were 
cooperative and provided all requested information on their cases, several did not and in 
their cases we were restricted to data that could be obtained from the bankruptcy case 
files and PACER.
The Project collected extensive data on most of the sample cases, including: case 
number; district; trustee; judge; debtor’s attorney; whether the petition was individual or 
joint; the gender of the petitioner; whether the petitioner was doing business under 
another name; zip code; county; dates of filing, first meeting of creditors and case 
closing; case disposition – dismissal before confirmation, dismissal after confirmation, 
conversion before confirmation, conversion after confirmation, or discharge; the number 
and amounts of secured, priority, general and other claims; amounts paid to creditors, 
debtor’s attorney, and the trustee; whether payments were made by payroll deduction; 
dates of last payment to attorney and trustee; proposed and actual plan length; proposed 
Consumer Chapter Choice, ABI J. (May 1999), p. 20 (finding that the “percentage of chapter 13 filings in a 
state tend to vary directly with the numbers of filings per 1000 households in the state”).
192
  As discussed infra, notes 11-14 and accompanying text, the fact that most of the sample districts have a 
higher proportion of Chapter 13 filings than the national average did not detract from the representativeness 
of the sample.  Rather, the representativeness of the sample is likely a result of the fact that the districts 
included in the sample contain a large proportion, nearly 20%, of all Chapter 13 filings in 1994. 
193
  For a description of the PACER system, see http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/pacerdesc.html.  
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percentage payment to unsecured creditors; whether any creditor payments were to be 
made outside the plan, and the amounts thereof; number persons and dependants in 
debtor’s household; debtor and household gross income, net income and living expenses; 
attorneys’ fees; and previous and subsequent bankruptcy filings.  A copy of the Project 
Coding Sheet is included as Appendix B.  
Data were coded and entered into a spreadsheet twice, by two different research 
assistants, with conflicts resolved either by double-checking the source or by decision of 
the authors.  
C. Methodology
The Project seeks to measure the fresh start and rehabilitation features of Chapter 
13 by determining the rates of discharge, dismissal and conversion in the sample judicial 
districts, and by ascertaining the proportion of debtors who have filed previous and 
subsequent bankruptcies.  Regarding creditor repayment, we gathered data on the types 
and amounts of debt repaid by the debtors in the Chapter 13 Project, as well as by debtors 
in all districts covered by the United States Trustee Program over the past ten years. By 
comparing completed cases with dismissed and converted cases, the Project investigates 
the relation between case outcome and factors such as debtor income, plan length,
distribution to unsecured creditors, income retained for payment of household expenses, 
and previous bankruptcy filings.  
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 13 PROJECT CODING SHEET
Part I – Chapter 13 Trustee’s Complete Print Inquiry
A – INFORMATION FROM PAGE 1
DISTRICT __________________ TRUSTEE __________________
INDEX # ___________________ CASE # ____________________
JOINT/INDIV 1 Individual 2 Joint
GENDER (for indiv. Filing only) 1 Male 2 Female 3 Unsure
D/B/A 1 Yes d/b/a 2 No d/b/a
ZIP CODE ____________ FILING DATE (mm/dd/yy) ________________________
1st MTNG DATE (mm/dd/yy) ______________ CONF. DATE (mm/dd/yyyy) _______________
CLOSE DATE (mm/dd/yy) ___________________ CLOSE CODE _____
DISBURSEMENT 1 Yes 2 No
COMPANION(S) __________;__________;__________;_________;__________;__________
JUDGE _____________________ DEBTOR’S ATTORNEY ________________________
PLAN BASE ______ BALANCE ON HAND _______ TOTAL PAID IN ______
PAID TO CREDITORS ___________ ATTY FEE DUE __________ ATTY FEE PD ______
TO BE CURRENT ______________ TRUSTEE FEE PAID _______________  
FILING FEE PAID ______ NOTICE FEE PD _____  TOTAL DISBURSED  ____________
% TO UNSECURED ____ DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION (mm/dd/yy) ______________
DEBTOR # 1 PAYROLL DEDUCTION (amount) ______
PAYROLL DEDUCTION SCHEDULE 1 Monthly 2 Bi-monthly
3       Bi-weekly 4 Weekly
5       Quarterly 6 Yearly
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DEBTOR # 1 DIRECT PAYMENT (amount) ______
DIRECT PAYMENT SCHEDULE 1 Monthly 2 Bi-monthly
3       Bi-weekly 4 Weekly
5          Quarterly 6 Yearly
DEBTOR # 2 PAYROLL DEDUCTION (amount) ______
PAYROLL DEDUCTION SCHEDULE 1 Monthly 2 Bi-monthly
3          Bi-weekly 4 Weekly
5          Quarterly 6 Yearly
DEBTOR # 2 DIRECT PAYMENT (amount)______
DIRECT PAYMENT SCHEDULE 1 Monthly 2 Bi-monthly
3          Bi-weekly 4 Weekly
5 Quarterly 6 Yearly
DEBTOR # 1 SSN __________________ DEBTOR # 2 SSN _______________________
CONT. DEBT ARREARS ______ CONT. PMTS. ________ REG PMTS. ______
B -- DISBURSEMENT INFORMATION
DEBTOR REFUND _______ DATE OF LAST PMNT TO ATTY (mm/dd/yy) ______________
DATE OF LAST PAYMENT TO TRUSTEE (mm/dd/yy) _______________________________
C -- CLAIM RECORDS INFORMATION
TOTAL # OF PRIORITY CLAIMS ____ TOTAL # OF SECURED CLAIMS ____
TOTAL # OF OTHER CLAIMS _____ TOTAL # OF UNSECURED CLAIMS ___
(Description, e.g., co-signed, nondischargeable, etc.) _____________________
*PRIORITY CLAIM # 1
SCHED ______VALUE ________ CLAIM ________ TOTPD _____
INT % ___ INTPD _____ CRED % ____
TYPE 1 Tax 2 Support 3 Other  (specify) ____
PAID OUTSIDE OF PLAN? 1 Yes 2 No
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*PRIORITY CLAIM # 2
SCHED ______VALUE ________ CLAIM ________ TOTPD _____
INT % ___ INTPD _____ CRED % ____
TYPE 1 Tax 2 Support 3 Other  (specify) ____
PAID OUTSIDE OF PLAN? 1 Yes 2 No
*PRIORITY CLAIM # 3
SCHED ______VALUE ________ CLAIM ________ TOTPD _____
INT % ___ INTPD _____ CRED % ____
TYPE 1 Tax 2 Support 3 Other  (specify) ____
PAID OUTSIDE OF PLAN? 1 Yes 2 No
*SECURED CLAIM # 1
SCHED ______VALUE ________ CLAIM ________ TOTPD _____
INT % ___ INTPD _____ CRED % ____ PER MO. ______
TYPE 1 Mortgage 2 Mortgage Arrearage
3 Second Mortgage 4 2d Mortgage Arrearage
5 Third Mortgage 6 3d Mortgage Arrearage
7 Car (Year and Make) ___________________________
8 Household Goods (HHG) 9 Other (specify) _____
PAID OUTSIDE THE PLAN? 1 Yes 2 No
*SECURED CLAIM # 2
SCHED ______VALUE ________ CLAIM ________ TOTPD _____
INT % ___ INTPD _____ CRED % ____ PER MO. ______
TYPE 1 Mortgage 2 Mortgage Arrearage
3 Second Mortgage 4 2d Mortgage Arrearage
5 Third Mortgage 6 3d Mortgage Arrearage
7 Car (Year and Make) ____________________________
8 Household Goods (HHG) 9 Other (specify) _____
PAID OUTSIDE THE PLAN? 1 Yes 2 No
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*SECURED CLAIM # 3
SCHED ______VALUE ________ CLAIM ________ TOTPD _____
INT % ___ INTPD _____ CRED % ____ PER MO. ______
TYPE 1 Mortgage 2 Mortgage Arrearage
3 Second Mortgage 4 2d Mortgage Arrearage
5 Third Mortgage 6 3d Mortgage Arrearage
7 Car (Year and Make) ____________________________
8 Household Goods (HHG) 9 Other (specify) _____
PAID OUTSIDE THE PLAN? 1 Yes 2 No
*SECURED CLAIM # 4
SCHED ______VALUE ________ CLAIM ________ TOTPD _____
INT % ___ INTPD _____ CRED % ____ PER MO. ______
TYPE 1 Mortgage 2 Mortgage Arrearage
3 Second Mortgage 4 2d Mortgage Arrearage
5 Third Mortgage 6 3d Mortgage Arrearage
7 Car (Year and Make) ____________________________
8 Household Goods (HHG) 9 Other (specify) _____
PAID OUTSIDE THE PLAN? 1 Yes 2 No
*SECURED CLAIM # 5
SCHED ______VALUE ________ CLAIM ________ TOTPD _____
INT % ___ INTPD _____ CRED % ____ PER MO. ______
TYPE 1 Mortgage 2 Mortgage Arrearage
3 Second Mortgage 4 2d Mortgage Arrearage
5 Third Mortgage 6 3d Mortgage Arrearage
7 Car (Year and Make) ____________________________
8 Household Goods (HHG) 9 Other (specify) _____
PAID OUTSIDE THE PLAN? 1 Yes 2 No
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*SECURED CLAIM # 6
SCHED ______VALUE ________ CLAIM ________ TOTPD _____
INT % ___ INTPD _____ CRED % ____ PER MO. ______
TYPE 1 Mortgage 2 Mortgage Arrearage
3 Second Mortgage 4 2d Mortgage Arrearage
5 Third Mortgage 6 3d Mortgage Arrearage
7 Car (Year and Make) ____________________________
8 Household Goods (HHG) 9 Other (specify) _____
PAID OUTSIDE THE PLAN? 1 Yes 2 No
*SECURED CLAIM # 7
SCHED ______VALUE ________ CLAIM ________ TOTPD _____
INT % ___ INTPD _____ CRED % ____ PER MO. ______
TYPE 1 Mortgage 2 Mortgage Arrearage
3 Second Mortgage 4 2d Mortgage Arrearage
5 Third Mortgage 6 3d Mortgage Arrearage
7 Car (Year and Make) __________________
8 Household Goods (HHG) 9 Other (specify) _____
PAID OUTSIDE THE PLAN? 1 Yes 2 No
D – INFORMATION FROM LAST PAGE
*TOTAL PRIORITY
SCHEDULED ________ VALUE _________ CLAIM AMT ________
PRINCIPAL PAID_______ INTEREST PD ______
*TOTAL SECURED
SCHEDULED ________ VALUE _________ CLAIM AMT ________
PRINCIPAL PAID_______ INTEREST PD ______
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*TOTAL UNSECURED
SCHEDULED ________ VALUE _________ CLAIM AMT ________
PRINCIPAL PAID_______ INTEREST PD ______
*TOTAL OTHER
SCHEDULED ________ VALUE _________ CLAIM AMT ________
PRINCIPAL PAID_______ INTEREST PD ______
Part II – Court Files
A – FROM THE PETITION
COUNTY OF RESIDENCE  _______________
B – FROM THE PLAN
PLAN LENGTH (months) _____ PERCENT TO UNSECUREDS _____%
PROPOSED PAYMENTS TO TRUSTEE (amount) ______
PAYMENT SCHEDULE 1 Monthly 2 Bi-monthly
4       Bi-weekly 4 Weekly
5          Quarterly 6 Yearly
# OF SECURED CLAIMS TO BE PAID DIRECT/OUTSIDE OF PLAN _____
AMT OF DIRECT SECURED CLAIM # 1 _________ AMT OF MO. PMT. ________
AMT OF DIRECT SECURED CLAIM # 2 _________ AMT OF MO. PMT. ________
AMT OF DIRECT SECURED CLAIM # 3 _________ AMT OF MO. PMT. ________
# OF PRIORITY CLAIMS TO BE PAID DIRECT/OUTSIDE OF PLAN _____
AMT OF DIRECT PRIORITY CLAIM # 1 _________ AMT OF MO. PMT. ________
AMT OF DIRECT PRIORITY CLAIM # 2 _________ AMT OF MO. PMT. ________
# OF UNSECURED  CLAIMS TO BE PAID DIRECT/OUTSIDE OF PLAN _____
AMT OF DIRECT UNSECURED CLAIM # 1 _________ AMT OF MO. PMT. ______
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AMT OF DIRECT UNSECURED CLAIM # 2 _________ AMT OF MO. PMT. ______
C – FROM SCHEDULES I AND J
NUMBER IN HH (including DR) _____NUMBER OF DEPENDANTS ____
DEBTOR GROSS MONTHLY INCOME _________ DEBTOR NET ___________
SPOUSE GROSS MONTHLY INCOME  _______ SPOUSE NET ___________
MONTHLY EXPENSES _____________
D – FROM STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
PREPETITION ATTY FEE PAYMENT FOR BANKRUPTCY REPRESENTATION ________
Part III – Previous and Subsequent Filings
PREVIOUS FILING? 0 No 1 Yes # OF PREV FILINGS ___
SUBSEQUENT FILING? 0 No 1 Yes # OF SUBSEQ. FILINGS __
CH. OF PREVIOUS FILING # 1 1 Ch. 7 2 Ch. 13 3 Ch. 11
CASE NUMBER _______________________
DATE (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
DISPOSITION 1 Dismissed 2 Discharge 3 Converted
DATE OF DISPOSITION (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
CH. OF PREVIOUS FILING # 2 1 Ch. 7 2 Ch. 13 3 Ch. 11
CASE NUMBER _______________________
DATE (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
DISPOSITION 1 Dismissed 2 Discharge 3 Converted
DATE OF DISPOSITION (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
79
CH. OF PREVIOUS FILING # 3 1 Ch. 7 2 Ch. 13 3 Ch. 11
CASE NUMBER _______________________
DATE (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
DISPOSITION 1 Dismissed 2 Discharge 3 Converted
DATE OF DISPOSITION (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
CH. OF PREVIOUS FILING # 4 1 Ch. 7 2 Ch. 13 3 Ch. 11
CASE NUMBER _______________________
DATE (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
DISPOSITION 1 Dismissed 2 Discharge 3 Converted
DATE OF DISPOSITION (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
CH. OF PREVIOUS FILING # 5 1 Ch. 7 2 Ch. 13 3 Ch. 11
CASE NUMBER _______________________
DATE (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
DISPOSITION 1 Dismissed 2 Discharge 3 Converted
DATE OF DISPOSITION (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
CH. OF SUBSQ. FILING # 1 1 Ch. 7 2 Ch. 13 3 Ch. 11
CASE NUMBER _______________________
DATE (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
DISPOSITION 1 Dismissed 2 Discharge 3 Converted 4  Open
DATE OF DISPOSITION (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
CH. OF SUBSQ. FILING # 2 1 Ch. 7 2 Ch. 13 3 Ch. 11
CASE NUMBER _______________________
DATE (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
DISPOSITION 1 Dismissed 2 Discharge 3 Converted 4  Open
DATE OF DISPOSITION (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
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CH. OF SUBSQ. FILING # 3 1 Ch. 7 2 Ch. 13 3 Ch. 11
CASE NUMBER _______________________
DATE (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
DISPOSITION 1 Dismissed 2 Discharge 3 Converted 4  Open
DATE OF DISPOSITION (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
CH. OF SUBSQ. FILING # 4 1 Ch. 7 2 Ch. 13 3 Ch. 11
CASE NUMBER _______________________
DATE (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
DISPOSITION 1 Dismissed 2 Discharge 3 Converted 4  Open
DATE OF DISPOSITION (dd/mm/yyyy) ________________________
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